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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE AIM TO BE SAVED 
 
 
No one tends with desire and zeal towards something that is not 
already known to him. But . . . men are ordained by the divine 
Providence towards a higher good than human fragility can experience 
in the present life. That is why it was necessary for the human mind 
to be called to something higher than the human reason here and now 
can reach, so that it would thus learn to desire something and with 
zeal tend towards something that surpasses the whole state of the 
present life. 
—St. Thomas Aquinas1 
It is not unusual, given the diversity of religious belief in the Western world, 
for there to be interactions between believers of different faiths. Some of these 
interactions are obviously quite hostile, resulting in vehement arguments and the 
occasional threat of damnation, but other interactions between religious believers of 
different faiths can be very warm and pleasant. In my experience, I have witnessed 
both sorts of interactions, and I have also been subject to them. 
This diversity of religious belief in the world produces a variety of questions 
and a variety of problems for religious believers. For example, we might take the 
view of someone I will call a religious exclusivist; a religious exclusivist,
                                                          
1 Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God, 69. 
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for my use, holds that those who are not members of her specific religion, or perhaps 
even her specific sect within a religion, will suffer either temporary or eternal 
punishment after death for either their contrary religious beliefs or their lack of 
particular beliefs. If this religious exclusivist holds that God is wholly good, 
powerful, and knowledgeable, then she may need some reason to explain how God’s 
goodness is consistent with the pain and suffering of those outside of her religion or 
sect. So this reason should explain why people with contrary faiths to her own will 
not join her immediately or, perhaps, eternally in a heavenly afterlife upon their 
death (or, if heaven is composed of layers, there would need to be some reason that 
explains why not everyone ended up in the same level of heavenly bliss) while 
maintaining God’s goodness. Now, this distinction between the unsaved (i.e. those 
who experience an eternal state of punishment after death—or else they have 
passed out of existence permanently), the saved (i.e. those who experience no state of 
punishment after death and exist eternally in bliss), and the quasi-saved (i.e. those 
who experience a temporary state of punishment after death until they exist 
eternally in bliss) is one that I will maintain throughout the duration of this thesis. 
Further, there might be degrees of punishment for the unsaved and quasi-saved or 
bliss for the saved and quasi-saved, but for the sake of brevity, I will not elaborate 
on these degrees of bliss or punishment. 
The distinction between the saved, unsaved, and quasi-saved will give rise to 
certain questions for the religious exclusivist that are potentially problematic: Is 
there some sort of unconditional election to salvation where God saves only those 
whom God chooses to save—independent of the will of those who both desire and 
seek salvation but are not saved? Or, is there some other criteria for salvation, one 
that weighs the sincerity of the believer, their moral character, or their genuine 
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struggle to find the correct religion? Is the opportunity to go to heaven or hell made 
equal for all persons—particularly those who have not been exposed to the 
exclusivist’s religion? Could anyone truly be worthy of some sort of hell? Could 
anyone truly be worthy of some sort of heaven? 
In contrast, the religious pluralist, for my use here, is a person who holds 
that many or all of the established religions are capable of producing salvation for 
their adherents; however, this does not mean that all of these religions produce 
salvation just as well as their complements. Now, let us take a religious pluralist 
who holds that God is wholly good, powerful, and knowledgeable. This person may 
escape some of the problems of the religious exclusivist by positing that the souls of 
every religious person (or almost every religious person) will be saved upon death, 
but if this is the case, then there are other problematic questions. For example, if 
every religious person will be saved in some sort of afterlife, why would they live this 
life on earth at all? Or, if every religious person will be saved, does it matter which 
religion you hold to be true? Is there a true religion? Or, should we take every 
religion to be true in some respect, and should we take these collective respects to 
compose a true religion? 
Any view on the gradient of belief between the religious exclusivist and 
religious pluralist will likely need to offer explanations for problematic questions 
too. For example, these questions would likely be framed in the following format: 
why would it be that one would be saved under certain conditions of grace when 
others are not saved under those same conditions of grace? Alternatively, we might 
reject all of the views given thus far by imagining that all of them are wrong. 
Suppose that God exists and is wholly good, powerful, and knowledgeable, but, 
instead of everyone being saved, let us imagine that no one is saved—everyone 
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ceases to exist at death and no one is brought back to life after death. This view 
seems plausible, but it also has some problematic questions of its own. For example, 
if no one is saved and there is no final judgement for human souls to receive justice 
for wrongs left undone in this life, can God appropriately be called just? If this life is 
all that there is, is there anyway to reconcile the happiness of evil people and the 
suffering of good people in this finite life with God’s justice? 
The diversity of religious belief seems to require explanations for any view of 
salvation that I have mentioned, and most (if not all) explanations that are offered 
as answers to the questions that I raised are likely to breed problematic questions of 
their own. However, out of these explanations, a type of salvation that strikes me, a 
priori, as the most reasonable form of salvation is the salvation wherein some 
human persons are saved, but there is at least some sort of temporary punishment 
(if not eternal punishment) for a population of persons who failed to satisfy a 
reasonable standard for salvation. Now, this reasonable standard of salvation would 
need to satisfy certain criteria in order for it to appropriately be called reasonable, 
and, while I do not have a complete list of criteria that would be sufficient for a 
reasonable standard of salvation, I think that I have, at least, a list of some 
necessary conditions for a reasonable standard and they are as follows: 
(1) The standard of salvation would need to separate the saved, 
unsaved, and quasi-saved (I am not assuming that there are, in 
fact, persons in each of these categories) judging by some 
objective criteria. 
(2) The judgement of the objective criteria would need to be 
applied justly to all. 
(3) The criteria should involve performing some voluntary act(s) 
(unless the person is incapable of the voluntary act(s), in which 
case, it might be possible for someone to do the act for them 
provided either their voluntary consent or, because of the 
inability to consent, reasonable consent on their behalf) or 
refraining from some voluntary act(s). 
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(4) The voluntary act(s) should not be arbitrarily picked by God, 
and the voluntary act(s) should affect the relation between the 
human person and God. 
(5) The knowledge that one ought to complete or refrain from the 
voluntary act(s) as well as how to complete or not complete the 
voluntary act(s) would need to be either evident or available to 
be known by investigation to a population of persons. This 
population of persons would include either, at minimum, (a) 
those who would satisfy the standard of the voluntary act(s) if 
they knew about them or, at most, (b) all human persons who 
are capable of coming to this knowledge. 
(i) If knowledge of the voluntary act(s) is available by 
investigation, then the knowledge that one ought to 
investigate should be evident to either population (a) or 
(b). 
(ii) The investigation should not be practically impossible to 
complete for either population (a) or (b). 
 
Now, with regard to these criteria, I think that they are fairly clear and 
agreeable, and they strike me, intuitively, as necessary for some sort of reasonable 
standard of salvation—provided an all-powerful savior. However, with the aim of 
anticipating confusion or objections I think that it would be good to elaborate on 
some of the ideas that have the potential to be problematic or misunderstood. These 
are standards three, four, and five. 
On standard three, I think that it is clear that salvation, if it is to be 
exclusive in any way (whether by some temporary punishment or some eternal 
punishment, or else by differing levels of happiness or pain), that the grounds for 
discriminating against certain persons should supervene on voluntary act(s) 
committed by those persons (for my purpose here, I will consider the mental act of 
assenting to a particular belief to be a type of voluntary act). For if we suppose that 
the contrary were true, that persons should receive punishment or reward for some 
non-voluntary property (e.g. the natural color of one’s hair, one’s natural height, 
one’s natural intelligent) or some involuntary act (e.g. one might go to heaven 
because they were coerced into performing some good moral deed or one might go to 
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hell because dementia impeded their ability to fulfill certain moral demands), then 
this set of criteria would strike me as quite unreasonable. Further, I think that the 
condition of some criteria being “unreasonable,” in this case, is sufficient to provide 
strong reason to doubt that God would use it as a means for salvation. Now, I will 
not thoroughly defend, in this thesis, the idea that God cannot be unreasonable. 
However, I tend to think that God, if God exists, must be reasonable, and by 
“reasonable” I mean the correct exercise of the intellectual virtues like wisdom, 
knowledge, prudence, and the like. Thus, if we suppose that God is absolutely 
perfect both in God’s person(s) and in the exercise of God’s will, then I find it difficult 
to imagine a case wherein God would be unreasonable without manifesting some 
imperfection of an intellectual virtue.2 
On standard four, I think that it would be unreasonable for God, who truly 
cares about the person who could be saved, to arbitrarily pick some voluntary action 
on her part that is insignificant and then judge from this arbitrary, voluntary action 
whether to save this human person after all. For example, I suspect that we would 
find it absurd for some excellent hero to save only and all persons who always said 
“gesundheit” whenever someone sneezed within their proximate vicinity—
particularly since saying “gesundheit” does not, itself, express the desire to be saved, 
even if it is polite. Thus, it would seem that this voluntary act must not be arbitrary, 
and in order for it not to be arbitrary it must affect the relation between the human 
person and God. 
                                                          
2 Here I recognize that my exercise of reason is imperfect, and, as a consequence, my exercise of reason 
could come into conflict with God’s standard of what is reasonable. Thus, I recognize that the 
imposition of my ideas of what standards are reasonable on God is unwarranted; even so, it does not 
seem to me that I am intuiting anything too controversial for what would constitute a reasonable 
standard of salvation here. Unless this becomes particularly controversial, I think that these conditions 
are reasonable and evident. 
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On standard five, it strikes me as obviously true that if God is both good and 
powerful and God desires the salvation of all humans, then God would desire that 
these human persons, who are eligible for salvation, are capable of coming to know 
the beliefs necessary for being saved (if there are any) or how they ought to behave 
with respect to the voluntary act(s) that affects their salvation. This would not mean 
that these persons must know how to become saved. However, it would mean either 
that they do know how to increase their odds at salvation or else that they know 
that they ought to investigate something that will lead them to the knowledge of 
what they ought to do or what they ought to believe. As we shall see, Swinburne has 
some things to say about God’s revelation being hidden, so I will not expound on it 
further here. 
Before proceeding further, I should like to note that I am not suggesting that 
God is obligated to offer some standard of salvation, but I am suggesting that if God 
offers some standard of salvation, then it would likely be a reasonable standard of 
salvation. As my justification for this idea, I would restate that God must be 
reasonable; further, I would add that any perfect moral agent, when choosing 
between supererogatory acts, would likely choose a better kind of supererogatory act 
to commit. My reasoning is as follows: let us suppose that a perfectly good moral 
agent is choosing between charities (she can pick only one) that she will financially 
support in order to benefit a population of persons, P, in a third world country, and 
let us suppose that the act of donating to a charity, in this case, would be a 
supererogatory act to commit. Now, our perfectly good moral agent, while not 
obligated to give to a charity, would likely choose a charity that she thought was 
better than some of the other charities to give to; it is unlikely that she, being 
perfectly good, would choose the charity arbitrarily or that she would choose what 
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she thought was a lesser kind of charity to give to (barring exceptional cases like 
sentimental attachment to the charity, a personal relation to the charity, or some 
other such thing). Further, if she intends to benefit P because she truly cares about 
P, she will likely give to what she thinks is a better charity that will more effectively 
help P. For example, if most of P is suffering from starvation, then our perfect moral 
agent will be more inclined to give to a charity that will provide food for P rather 
than a charity that will provide dinnerware for P. 
All things being equal, our moral agent, while not obligated to give to what 
she thought was a better kind of charity, would likely give to a better kind of charity 
in virtue of her perfect goodness. By similar reasoning, we might suppose that if God 
is perfectly good and God offers a standard of salvation to the sincere investigator, 
then God would offer a better standard of salvation, not an arbitrary standard of 
salvation or a lesser standard of salvation. Now, it is not clear exactly what a better 
standard of salvation would consist of in this case with God, but I think that a better 
standard of salvation would likely be both reasonable and non-arbitrary since these 
properties would make it easier for the sincere investigator to discern and satisfy 
this standard—rather than an unreasonable and arbitrary standard of salvation. If 
God were extending salvation to human persons because God genuinely desired 
their salvation, then a better standard of salvation would be more consistent with 
God’s perfect goodness and God’s desire that the standard of salvation is effective at 
producing salvation. Thus, it could very well be that God has not offered salvation to 
humanity; all the same, if we suppose that God has offered salvation, then the 
standard for this salvation would likely be both reasonable and non-arbitrary. 
Now, if we assume that God exists, that God is wholly good, powerful, and 
knowledgeable and that God freely wills our existence, then it would be reasonable 
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to suppose that God likely possesses a certain positive disposition toward us. 
Further, if we grant that each person is a unique universe of complex personality, 
character, will, and mystery that is both capable of being saved and whose 
redemption from defects is good and desirable for any excellent moral agent, then it 
would be reasonable to suppose that God would seek to save at least some human 
persons by offering a reasonable standard of salvation. Now, once someone has 
agreed to the idea that a perfect God, who is wholly good and powerful, can and 
would save human persons since it would be good and reasonable to do so, then she 
will likely begin to look for a means by which she can ascertain God’s reasonable 
standard of salvation before attempting to satisfy this standard. However, this 
brings us to a problem for our sincere investigator because there seems to be a 
plethora of religions that claim to offer God’s standard of salvation that one should 
satisfy, and these standards are conflicting. Given that there are many religions to 
choose from and that there appears, at our outset, to be no clear method by which 
our sincere investigator can evaluate religions for their efficacy at producing 
salvation, there seems to be a problem with the standard of salvation itself. 
Specifically, the investigation appears to be practically impossible, and this is 
because we do not have, yet, a clear means by which we can evaluate the multitude 
of religious claims. Thus, the sincere investigator of the reasonable standard of 
salvation is stuck trying to solve this complicated problem, and the existence of this 
problem could threaten the idea that there is a reasonable standard of salvation at 
all. 
Now, I noted that it is not necessary on the reasonable standard of salvation 
for one to know what the voluntary act(s) are that satisfy this standard; it is only 
requisite that we, who would do them, know that we ought to do the voluntary act(s) 
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and how to do the voluntary act(s) (or else know that we ought to mount an 
investigation inquiring about the voluntary act[s]). Further, I noted that the 
voluntary act(s) would not be arbitrary; rather, they would affect a particular 
relation between us and God. Thus, it could very well be that there is some standard 
of salvation and that no group of religious persons knows the voluntary act(s) that 
satisfy the standard of salvation. Instead, it could be that the voluntary act(s) is 
something as simple as being a good parent. Such a set of voluntary actions 
contained within the activity of being a good parent would certainly seem to 
establish a particular relation between one and God—it would help one to see God as 
her parent. Or, the voluntary acts might be performing charitable deeds for those in 
significant need. Such voluntary acts would certainly seem to establish a particular 
relation between one and God—one might come to realize how God is really the 
charitable source of his existence. However, the problem is that neither of these 
things may actually be the voluntary act(s) that satisfy the standard of salvation; 
without epistemic access to the supernatural state of salvation or a supernatural 
witness who can testify concerning salvation, we cannot know what standard is 
sufficient for salvation. As a consequence, we are left with two main duties in the 
effort to be saved: an obligation to perform all of our own moral duties to the best of 
our ability (in case one or more of those duties satisfies the standard of salvation by 
establishing a particular relation between us and God) as well as the obligation to 
investigate as many religions as we can (unless we become convinced of one along 
the way) to see if God has revealed the voluntary act(s) that satisfy the standard of 
salvation in one of those religions to some prophet. As we proceed, our relevant 
question is: as we investigate these religions, what criteria could we use to evaluate 
them? 
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It is my hope in this thesis to explicate methods for evaluating purported 
divine revelations. I intend to pursue this goal, in the second chapter, by reviewing 
literature on the nature of divine revelation and why one would expect to receive 
divine revelation through a religion. Next, in three two I aim to articulate the 
central problem of this thesis with more exactness, and there I offer defenses against 
the strong version of this problem that I call the Problem Set. Next in chapter four, I 
offer defenses against the weak version of this problem that I call the Problem Set*. 
For example, I offer Swinburne’s tests for candidate divine revelations as well as my 
own ideas on what criteria would likely be consistent with an authentic divine 
revelation that conveys the voluntary act(s) that affects one’s salvation. Next, I 
discuss some of the complexity of an ethical evaluation of a religion, and I offer an 
example of an ethical evaluation of a religion. Finally, I conclude with ideas on how 
some attempts to solve this problem might help with additional problems in the 
philosophy of religion. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION 
 
 
The philosophy of revelation is a field of inquiry that has recently been 
attracting more interest and investigation within the philosophy of religion in the 
works of Swinburne, Plantinga, Menssen and Sullivan, King, Moser, Blauuw, and 
Abraham (to name a few). Given that the rationality of many religions (particularly 
Western religions) is contingent upon claims to divine revelation, the subject of 
divine revelation in philosophy and theology is vitally important for (prospective) 
adherents of those religions as well as critics of those religions. Due to attacks by 
Kitcher and other atheists on claims to divine revelation, the philosophy of 
revelation will likely become a subject of increasing interest. In order to give a brief 
introduction on the philosophy of revelation, I will proceed by summarizing the work 
of Blaauw on the nature of divine revelation and the work of Swinburne on why one 
should expect a divine revelation before articulating the central problem of this 
thesis. 
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Section I: Blaauw 
The Nature of Ordinary Revelation 
Blaauw, on the nature of divine revelation, draws a few distinctions on what 
sorts of divine revelation can take place; these, he thinks, are propositional 
revelation and self-revelation. A propositional revelation, as the name implies, is 
simply a case where a proposition is revealed to the epistemic agent such as, “Mary 
revealed to her mother that she had stolen the cookies.”3 However, a self-revelation 
is a revelation wherein one discloses herself to the epistemic agent, “The thief 
revealed herself from behind the curtains.”4 In the latter case of self-revelation, for 
Blaauw, the thief does not reveal any sort of proposition; instead, the thief merely 
reveals herself. Thus, when we speak of divine revelation, we should either refer to 
some case of divine self-revelation or some case of divine propositional revelation. 
Given this distinction, Blaauw focuses on the latter case. 
Moving on to two further distinctions, according to Blaauw propositions can 
be revealed in either of two ways: (first) an agent can reveal proposition P by 
asserting P directly or (second) an agent can reveal proposition P by manifesting 
proposition P. In the first case, an agent might assert that P by simply writing, 
saying, or communicating that P in some other language (e.g. sign language) 
directly. However, an agent can manifest that P, according to Blaauw, by revealing 
that P without asserting that P. For example, if we suppose that a mother asks her 
hired private investigator if the girl in front of her is her long-lost daughter and the 
private investigator responds with a sincere grin, Blaauw thinks that the private 
investigator has manifested the proposition that the girl in front of the mother is her 
                                                          
3 Blaauw, “The Nature of Divine Revelation,” 3. 
4 Ibid. 
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long lost daughter. Thus, when considering divine revelation, we might ask whether 
that revelation is propositionally asserted or manifested. 
Provided these distinctions, Blaauw approaches the analysis of divine 
revelation in the context of ordinary uses of revelation (or cases of non-divine 
revelation). Within this analysis, Blaauw comes to the conclusion that a genuine 
instance of revelation takes place provided the following: 
S reveals p to r if and only if: 
(A) s communicates that p to r. 
(B) p is true. 
(C) s believes that p is true. 
(D) the communication of p by s removes deep ignorance.5 
 
Condition (A) is taken to be obvious, but in support of condition (B), Blaauw 
reasons that the verb, “to reveal,” is a factive verb because “it is simply not possible 
to reveal falsehoods, just as it is impossible to know falsehoods.”6 For example, it 
would seem strange to imagine a case wherein two women, Sophia and Sapientia, 
are talking when Sophia reveals to Sapientia that Sapientia’s husband is cheating 
on her when, in fact, Sapientia’s husband is not cheating on her. This use of “reveal” 
would seem counterintuitive; our contemporary use of the verb “to reveal” seems to 
imply that whatever is revealed must be true. 
In support of condition (C) above, Blaauw argues that in order for something 
to genuinely be revealed, the issuer of the proposition must believe that the 
proposition really is true. To use an example similar to Blaauw’s, if Sophia had told 
Sapientia that Sapientia’s husband had been cheating on her but that Sophia didn’t 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 6. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
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really think that Sapientia’s husband was cheating on her, then, Blaauw thinks, “we 
wouldn’t want to say that [Sophia] revealed anything.”7 
Finally, in support of condition (D), Blaauw argues that “we can speak of a 
revelation only if something that was previously unknown becomes known. 
Revelation removes something: ignorance.”8 However, in Blaauw’s view revelation 
does not remove just any sort of ignorance; it removes, what he calls, deep ignorance. 
Shallow ignorance, as opposed to deep ignorance, is the communication of more 
mundane facts that do not count as cases of revelation in Blaauw’s view. For 
example, if someone does not know who the president of Russia is and another 
person tells them that the president of Russia is Putin, then new knowledge has 
been communicated to the first person, but this would not be, in Blaauw’s view, a 
case of revelation. Instead, revelation, Blaauw thinks, is meant to be a case where a 
serious sort of ignorance is removed from someone; thus the condition of deep 
ignorance is satisfied when a communication “unveil[s] something of great 
significance.”9 
Now, Blaauw notes that in order to reveal something to someone, it is not 
necessary for one to intend to reveal some piece of information for that piece of 
information to be revealed. In fact, Blaauw thinks that there are cases of both 
intentional revelation and non-intentional revelation. For example, if we suppose 
that Sophia had written in her journal that Sapientia’s husband was cheating on her 
and Sapientia happened to read Sophia’s journal, then, in Blaauw’s view, it would 
have been revealed to Sapientia that her husband was cheating on her. 
 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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Potential Problems 
Given the idea of ordinary revelation offered in the previous section, Blaauw 
notes that there are three potential problems with this understanding of the idea of 
revelation, and they are as follows: First, the idea of deep ignorance seems to 
suggest that ignorance comes in degrees; however, if ignorance comes in degrees, 
then it might seem that revelation comes in degrees as well. However, Blaauw 
thinks that revelation does not come in degrees. Second, it is not clear what degree 
of deep ignorance is needed in order to satisfy the condition necessary for revelation. 
Third, revelation might seem to be dependent upon the whether ignorance is 
actually removed. 
In answering the first concern, Blaauw writes that degrees of ignorance need 
not imply degrees of revelation, and he thinks that he can test whether the idea of 
revelation could admit of degrees. “Degree concepts, for instance, can be modified by 
degree modifiers such as ‘very.’”10 Now, it might be reasonable to say that someone is 
“very tall” or that someone is “very smart” because both of these ideas, in Blaauw’s 
view, would admit of degrees, and they admit to degrees because they admit to 
degree modifiers. However, he thinks, the idea of revelation does not admit to 
degrees because it sounds incorrect to say “Sophia very revealed to Sapientia that…” 
or “Sophia revealed more to Susan that Sapientia’s…” Thus, “on the basis of this 
piece of linguistic evidence we should conclude that the concept of revelation is not a 
degree concept.”11 Further, Blaauw notes that the fact that ignorance admits to 
degrees does not imply that the concept connected to it, revelation, should admit to 
degrees as well. He uses the example of baldness and degrees of hairs: it would 
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make sense to say that one has “more hairs” or “fewer hairs” such that one is more 
bald or less bald. The amount of hairs on a bald head can vary, so this means that 
baldness admits to degree. However, having precisely zero hairs, which entails the 
degree concept of baldness, does not admit to degrees. Thus, in Blaauw’s view, 
parallel reasoning would suggest that revelation does not admit to degrees—but 
ignorance does. 
One might object to Blaauw’s view on revelation not admitting to degrees by 
saying that a proposition can be “very revelatory.” A revelation, R1, that was more 
revelatory than another revelation, R2, would likely contain more information than 
R2. For example, “Sophia’s husband is cheating on her,” seems to be less revelatory 
than, “Sophia’s husband is cheating on her with her best friend,” even though both 
statements would be a revelation to Sophia. Now, between these two statements 
about Sophia’s husband cheating on her, the person who communicated the former 
statement would have said something less revelatory than the one who 
communicated the latter statement. However, this objection, in my view, does not 
threaten Blaauw’s conditions of a revelation; I take it that what is important for 
Blaauw’s conditions of a revelation is that there is a threshold of significance for a 
proposition to be a revelation—not that revelation should not consist of degrees.  
In answering the second concern about the need to specify the degree of deep 
ignorance, Blaauw writes that the degree of deepness needed to satisfy the criteria 
for a revelation depends on the stakes of the receiver. He defines the concept more 
formally in the following: 
. . . the communication of the information that p removes deep 
ignorance if and only if (i) the communication of p actually produces 
knowledge in the receiver of the information, and (ii) the knowledge 
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thus gained has a positive influence on the practical interests (or 
stakes) of the receiver of the information.12 
 
Further, Blaauw writes that it is not necessary for the receiver to be aware 
that she is in a high-stakes situation in order for deep ignorance to be removed. He 
uses the example of a person who becomes aware of a Rembrandt painting hidden 
away in their father’s basement due to their father’s disclosure of the information. 
Blaauw writes that if this person became aware of the location of this painting 
without also knowing of his impending bankruptcy, then, intuitively, this case 
should still count as revelation. However, Blaauw notes that this shifting of the 
degree of deep ignorance to the idea of high-stakes would seem to simply shift the 
problem to the degree of high-stakes. In response to this idea, Blaauw writes that 
“perhaps we should give a counterfactual answer and say that the stakes are high if 
the subject would agree to being in a high-stakes situation in case someone 
explained to her what the stakes were.”13 
In answering the third worry about whether ignorance is actually removed in 
the case of revelation, Blaauw considers the view of Wolterstorff. According to 
Blaauw, Wolterstorff holds that a revelation occurs when information is 
communicated that would remove ignorance provided both attention and 
interpretive skills. In response to this view, Blaauw writes that this view is 
incorrect, and an example that Blaauw uses in support of his view is the following: 
suppose that one person announced information to a sleeping person about 
something that is a high-stakes situation for the sleeping person. In this case, 
Blaauw writes that Wolterstorff’s idea of revelation would be satisfied, but it would 
seem, according to our intuitions, that nothing was really revealed to the sleeping 
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person. Further, Blaauw writes that revelation seems to require that the 
information communicated in the revelation really is received. For example, Blaauw 
writes that, “The old man revealed to us where the jewels are buried and we have no 
idea where they are buried,” sounds incoherent. 14  Thus, revelation, for Blaauw, 
implies that the information conveyed has been received. 
The Nature of Divine Revelation 
On the nature of divine revelation, Blaauw thinks that we can qualify the 
conditions on ordinary revelation to give us an understanding of the conditions 
necessary for divine revelation. For example, he takes the case of Jesus saying, “One 
should love one’s neighbor.” 15  Starting with condition (A) (the condition of 
communication of a proposition from one person to another person), Blaauw thinks 
that Jesus is clearly asserting the proposition given; however, Blaauw notes that it 
is possible for Jesus to have manifested the proposition that one ought to love one’s 
neighbor by sincerely acting that way. Thus, in Blaauw’s view, this statement meets 
the first criteria necessary to constitute a revelation. 
Before proceeding, however, Blaauw notes that it might be possible in cases 
of divine revelation that God neither assert nor manifest a revelation. Instead, it 
might be “possible for God to communicate propositions by simply causing us to 
believe the proposition.” 16  Thus, the idea of communication in condition (A), 
according to Blaauw, should be interpreted quite broadly. 
Briefly, with respect to condition (B) (the proposition must be true) and 
condition (C) (the proponent of the revelation must believe that the revelation is 
true), Blaauw thinks that if either the proposition were false or else if Jesus thought 
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it was false, then it would not be a case of divine revelation. Thus, these conditions 
of ordinary revelation seem to also hold for divine revelation. 
With respect to condition (D) (the proposition must remove deep ignorance), 
Blaauw thinks that this condition on ordinary revelation should also count on divine 
revelation. For example, if the proposition that one should love one’s neighbor trivial 
and well-known, then it “intuitively wouldn’t count as a revelation of this 
proposition. The ignorance lost—and the knowledge gained—should be of 
importance.”17 Further, Blaauw thinks that the communication of this proposition 
should produce knowledge in the target audience; if the target audience did not 
possess the skill or attention to properly receive the proposition, then it would not be 
a case of revelation. 
Lastly, Blaauw thinks that the four conditions of ordinary revelation also 
hold (in a qualified way) for divine revelation. Specifically, the conditions are as 
follows: the proposition must be communicated, it must be true, it must be believed 
to be true by the issuer of the revelation, and the revelation must remove deep 
ignorance in the receiver. Due to the similarities of the necessary conditions for 
ordinary revelation and divine revelation, one might object that there is no clear 
difference between ordinary revelation and divine revelation so far. To this, Blaauw 
responds, “In the case of ordinary revelation, but not in the case of divine revelation, 
information is communicated by a non-divine subject. What makes divine revelation 
divine is that a divine subject is responsible for the revelation.”18  Thus, divine 
communication requires both that conditions (A) through (D) are met and the issuer 
of the revelation is divine. As a consequence any sort of communication issued by 
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God toward a target audience that does not fully satisfy conditions (A) through (D) 
should, in Blaauw’s view, be called a case of divine communication—not divine 
revelation. Now, Blaauw notes that our sense of “revelation” might not be identical 
to ancient ideas of revelation in the same way that our sense of “knowledge” is likely 
not identical with some ancient senses of knowledge. However, Blaauw is interested 
in our sense of revelation and what we mean when we say something like divine 
revelation. 
Section II: Swinburne 
Reasons to Expect a Revelation 
Swinburne thinks that if an all-powerful and all-good God exists, then it is 
likely that this God would become incarnate during human history and make 
contact with human creatures in order to convey important information to them by 
means of revelation. One of the reasons he thinks this is that “there are matters 
which it would be very good for us to know which are such that either we could not 
find them out for ourselves, or we have not previously proved persistent or honest 
enough with ourselves to do so.”19 Of the kinds of things that Swinburne thinks that 
it would be good for God to reveal are the four following categories: knowledge of 
God’s nature, knowledge of the atonement for our wrongs and what the required 
reparation from us is, encouragement to do good and avoid evil, and clear knowledge 
of which actions are good and which are bad for us to commit. 
With respect to the first category—knowledge of God’s nature—Swinburne 
thinks that a God who created rational agents would likely want to interact with 
these rational agents in some way. However, in order to interact with God 
appropriately, these agents should have some sort of knowledge of God’s nature and 
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existence. Thus, revelations from God, according to Swinburne, would help to 
communicate “aspects to his being which humans are not well equipped to discover 
for themselves.” 20  Swinburne takes the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as an 
example; if God does exist as a community of persons, Swinburne thinks that 
humans could not have come to this knowledge of God’s nature independent of God 
revealing it to us. Consequently, “if we know about God that he is a Trinity, we will 
know him better and so be able to worship him more appropriately for what he is.”21 
Thus, through revelation humanity might come to knowledge of God that could not 
be reached by natural reason, and this knowledge would be important for our 
appropriate worship of God. 
Regarding the second category—knowledge of the atonement for our wrongs 
and what the required reparation from us is—Swinburne thinks that God would 
likely deal with the sin and suffering of the world by becoming incarnate, identifying 
with human suffering, and providing atonement for human sins. Swinburne goes on 
to note that in the case that one cannot make the satisfactory reparation for some 
wrongdoing, it is possible for someone else to provide the reparation for the guilty 
party. Thus, the one to whom the reparation is owed has a means to forgive the 
original guilty party of the need of reparation; however, Swinburne writes, it would 
be good for some lesser reparation to be required from the guilty party because this 
would “allow us, as free rational creatures, to take responsibility for the 
consequences of our freely chosen actions.”22 
Given that we need to offer reparation to God for the wrong done to our fellow 
creatures, our misuse of our lives, and our failure to worship God properly, according 
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to Swinburne, it would be good for God to require us to repent, apologize, and offer 
some form of reparation for our wrongdoing. So it is likely, in Swinburne’s view, both 
that God would reveal that there are wrongs that need to be atoned for before God 
and that the atonement and reparation revealed by God would likely take a 
particular form. This reparation, Swinburne writes, could be so great that we are not 
capable of satisfying it, so if we could not live the sort of life sufficient to provide an 
adequate reparation, it would be good for God to provide the reparation for us. Even 
though “it is not necessary that God himself should provide reparation by living the 
requisite sort of life, it is clearly good that God should do so.”23 Consequently, once 
the good reparation is offered, Swinburne thinks that it would be good for God to 
forgive us of our sins. 
Now, this forgiveness would not, in Swinburne’s view, remove all of the 
consequences of the wrongdoings done in the world. In fact, he thinks that all of the 
suffering and evil in the world are, in the end, necessary for greater goods; for 
example, it is difficult to imagine how one could achieve moral perfection with 
regard to the virtues (like courage) if one did not form a virtuous character in the 
presence of evil (like fear). Consequently, it would be good of God, in Swinburne’s 
view, to permit the evil consequences of people’s bad choices to come about even if 
the act, itself, is forgiven. 
Now, since Swinburne writes that it is good that God allows suffering in the 
world, he also thinks that it is good that God would share in the suffering of 
humans. Of course, Swinburne thinks that there is no obligation on God to do so, but 
he does think that it is good for God to share in the suffering of those whom God 
cares about like a parent willing to suffer some evil with their children—even if the 
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parent could be free of the evil when the children could not. Thus, it would be good 
for God to share in human suffering, show that God has shared in human suffering, 
and show that God believes the suffering to be worthwhile by facing it bravely. 
A priori reasoning, Swinburne writes, gives us good reason to suppose that 
God would become incarnate, live a perfect life under difficult conditions, express 
that he believes that he is God, and offer his suffering as atonement for our 
wrongdoing. However, Swinburne states that no a priori reasoning would give us 
evidence on when God would become incarnate and participate in human suffering. 
God, Swinburne writes, would need “to authenticate the information for which mere 
ordinary historical inquiry is an insufficient source.”24 Thus, through revelation God 
might communicate to humanity how to participate in an offering for atonement and 
forgiveness. 
With respect to the third category—to provide us with encouragement to do 
good and avoid evil—Swinburne writes that in the same way that parents might 
persuade their children to do good actions and avoid bad actions by offering rewards 
or punishments respectively: “God too may wish to encourage good actions and 
discourage us from bad actions by providing rewards and punishments.”25 Now, 
these rewards or punishments, Swinburne writes, would be fruitless if God did not 
communicate them to us. Thus, through revelation humanity could be both warned 
of the potential consequences of their actions and be incentivized to behave morally 
until their character takes moral behavior up for its own sake. 
Regarding the fourth category—clarity on which actions are good and which 
are bad—Swinburne writes that much of the evil committed by humanity is the 
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result of ignorance of which actions are good and which actions are bad. However, 
Swinburne thinks that if God wants people to be good, then they should do both 
what they think is good and what is, in fact, good. Thus, through revelation 
humanity might come to clearer conclusions of moral facts that are controversial. 
God and Morality 
From the reasons given above, Swinburne thinks that, assuming that God 
exists, we have good reason to expect a revelation from God. Additionally, he thinks 
that the communication of a revelation from God also has the potential to affect the 
moral properties of moral actions. Now, before giving examples wherein God’s 
commands affect the moral properties of moral actions Swinburne offers definitions 
for particular types of moral actions, and his definitions are as follows: 
Obligatory actions are those which we are blameworthy for not doing; 
supererogatory actions are those which we are praiseworthy for doing. 
Likewise among bad actions, there are those which it is obligatory not 
to do—these are wrong actions; and there are bad actions which are 
not wrong and which I call infravetatory. It is wrong to rape or steal; 
yet it is bad, but not wrong, to watch many low-grade thrillers on TV 
rather than read one or two great works of literature.26 
 
Continuing, Swinburne writes that differences in moral properties are 
supervenient on non-moral properties. For example, he wants to say that if two 
possible worlds are identical with respect to all non-moral properties, then it follows 
that they must also be identical with respect to moral properties. Further on moral 
properties, he thinks that there is a distinction between logically contingent moral 
truths and logically necessary moral truths that “must be true in virtue of the very 
nature of the actions with which they are concerned.”27 
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If God affects morality, in Swinburne’s view, then God cannot affect or 
change actions that are necessarily good or bad. He thinks, though, that God can 
affect contingent moral truths for the following reason: it is a necessary moral truth, 
Swinburne writes, that “it is very good to reverence the good and the wise and the 
truly great, and obligatory to thank and please benefactors.”28 Now, since God is 
wholly good, wise, great, and the source of both our being and our knowledge, 
Swinburne thinks that we owe a great deal of honor, praise, and worship to God. In 
his view, God sustains us in our existence, and any other goodness that we receive 
from someone else ultimately comes from God. Thus, God would be owed our praise 
and honor. Swinburne continues, writing that one way to please a benefactor is to 
obey their commands, and, provided “the necessary truth that beneficiaries have a 
duty to please benefactors” and the fact that God would be our greatest benefactor, it 
would follow that we have a duty to please God. Thus, God’s command to do 
something, according to Swinburne, would make it contingently the case that an 
action is morally obligatory when it would have been, other than for God’s command, 
either supererogatorily good or morally neutral. Alternatively, God’s command to 
refrain from something, for Swinburne, would make that thing that would be only 
infravetatorily bad or morally neutral, now, contingently wrong. Further, Swinburne 
writes that God’s commendations can make neutral actions supererogatorily good, 
and God’s discommendation can make a morally neutral action infravetatorily bad. 
However, God, who is wholly-good, would not command an action that is necessarily 
morally bad because “to command what you have no right to command is wrong.”29 
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In addition to God affecting the moral properties of actions that are morally 
neutral or else supererogatory or infravetatory, Swinburne writes that God can 
affect moral truths that humans ought to follow unless permitted to do otherwise by 
God. For example, Swinburne thinks that every life is a temporary gift from God, 
and it is within God’s rights to take the gift back when God chooses. Consequently, 
Swinburne argues that God does nothing wrong by ending one life sooner than 
another, and God is entitled to having humans kill other humans if God commands 
it. He reasons as follows: “if A has the right to take something from B, he has the 
right to allow C to do the job for him.”30 
Lastly, there are some actions, in Swinburne’s view, that are supererogatorily 
good that God can override and make bad—or the converse. For example, it is 
usually good to help the sick, but God could make it such that it is bad to help a 
particular sick person because, Swinburne writes, God has the right to allow 
someone to suffer for the sake of some greater good. 
Finally, all moral commands or prohibitions issued by God, Swinburne 
argues, can be grouped in the following four categories: 
1. God informs us of necessary moral truths, and God cannot 
change these truths. Also, God’s commands or prohibitions 
regarding necessary moral truths makes them doubly 
obligatory. 
2. God informs us of a necessary moral truth that we are bound to 
follow unless God permits otherwise. 
3. God issues a universal command for all people to follow 
throughout all time, and the action in question would not 
otherwise be obligatory. 
4. God issues a command to specific groups to do specific actions, 
and this command may be limited for a duration of time. This 
action would not otherwise be obligatory. 
 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
28 
 
Regarding the first two categories of commands above, Swinburne thinks 
that the reason God would issue commands like these is to “give us with further 
motivation to do what is obligatory anyway.”31 However, the reasons for God issuing 
commands in the latter two categories are, in Swinburne’s mind, more complex. For 
these categories, Swinburne writes that there are three sorts of reasons for God 
commanding or prohibiting actions and they are as follows: (first) to bring about 
coordinated good actions, (second) to further God’s designs with actions that would 
be good but otherwise not obligatory, and (third) to further our trust in God by doing 
actions that, except for a divine command, would be wrong. 
With respect to the first reason, Swinburne writes that it is important for 
there to be coordinated efforts on the part of God’s servants in order to accomplish 
tasks that any single servant could not do alone. Thus, it is important, in 
Swinburne’s view, that equally good tasks be accomplished with coordinated effort. 
Regarding the second reason of why God would issue commands in these 
categories, Swinburne thinks that God might issue commands to fulfill specific 
purposes; while fulfilling these purposes would be good in Swinburne’s view, they 
might not be obligatory without the command from God. For example, he writes that 
a parent might command their child to buy groceries for a sick neighbor, and the 
parent, by issuing this command, could intend that the act of the child, of helping 
out one’s neighbor, builds up the character of the child. In the same way, fulfilling 
God’s commands would build up the character of humans: “God rightly wants 
humans to become naturally holy, and so he has reason to help the process of our 
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sanctification by imposing obligations on us (by way of commands) for some or all of 
our earthly life.”32 
The third reason for God issuing commands in the last two categories is, 
according to Swinburne, to build up our loyalty and trust in God. Swinburne takes 
the example of a case where an action would normally be wrong to commit, but 
because God has commanded it, it becomes obligatory. This example is the case of 
God’s purported command to Abraham for him to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Swinburne 
writes that “God as the author of life had the right to terminate Isaac’s life and so to 
command Abraham to do so.”33 Swinburne thinks that this command for Abraham 
made it morally obligatory for Abraham to kill Isaac (unless there were some sort of 
retraction of the command on God’s part). Now, Swinburne notes that in a case like 
Abraham’s where they think that they have been commanded by God to kill 
someone, it would be necessary in order for him to not be culpable for the action that 
he have a very strong belief that God had, indeed, commanded them to kill the 
person. This sort of belief, arising only from “a very strong conviction of the presence 
of God and his voice commanding that action” or a strong belief evident from a 
public revelation “would suffice to make it on balance not (subjectively) wrong to 
perform the action.”34 Now, such an act would, of course, be very difficult for a 
humane person to perform even if they genuinely held a strong belief that it was the 
right thing to do; thus, Swinburne thinks that this sort of act for Abraham would 
have increased his trust in God and aided him in the process of sanctification. 
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Finally, Swinburne writes that if God does issue a command that changes the 
moral property of an action that it would be important for God to let us know what 
this command is so that we can fulfill it: 
And of course for knowledge of moral truths which are created by the 
command of God, we need God to tell us what they are; and if the 
truths about the morality of abortion or euthanasia are all in this 
category, then we need God to reveal to us what they are. Current 
moral disputes about marriage and divorce, homosexuality and 
cloning, who should govern states, or rule a church, illustrate further 
our need for God’s revelation in helping us to know what is right and 
what is wrong.35 
 
The Kind of Revelation Needed 
Swinburne thinks that if God communicates by a revelation, then it is 
reasonable to expect that God would communicate this revelation through one or 
more prophets, and these prophets would have evidence of God’s communication to 
them. This is because God, Swinburne writes, would have given humanity a 
responsibility for each of us to help each other, “and so it is to be expected that he 
would also give to humans the responsibility for helping each other to knowledge of 
what he has revealed, and thereby to knowledge of the way to our sanctification.”36 
Now, this revelation, in Swinburne’s view, would consist in how one ought to 
live, and this means that once one is given that information, either they can choose 
to follow it or not to follow it. Given that the purpose of the revelation is to confer a 
choice on whether to be good in certain respects or bad in certain respects, 
Swinburne writes that even the revelation, itself, ought to be a source of opportunity 
for choice. Specifically, Swinburne thinks that it is consonant with the purpose of 
the revelation that the revelation, itself, be hidden to some extent in order for people 
to find out “by investigation how we ought to live and thereby find our way to 
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Heaven, or to neglect to investigate this.”37 Thus, the revelation, in Swinburne’s 
view, should not be too evident, but it should also be discoverable. It is the 
hiddenness of the revelation, for Swinburne, that would manifest one’s commitment 
to the purposes of the revelation “by pursuing them when it is not certain that those 
goals are there to be had.”38 As a consequence, Swinburne writes that it is to be 
expected of a revelation from God that this revelation ought to be hidden to some 
extent in order for it to be searched out. 
Revelation for Different Cultures 
Given the reasons for God to offer a revelation, the subsequent problem that 
should be dealt with is the means of communicating the revelation; more 
specifically, Swinburne asks how such a revelation could be communicated across 
human history and human cultures. 
Now, since Swinburne thinks that it would be good for God to become 
incarnate in order to provide atonement for humanity and to identify with human 
suffering, he considers two possible cases of incarnation: God could have either 
multiple human incarnations or just one human incarnation. Settling for the latter 
case, Swinburne writes, “surely one perfect human life would avail for the whole 
human race. It trivializes the notion of a perfect atoning life to suppose otherwise; 
what atones is the quality of one life, not the number of lives.”39 Consequently, this 
one incarnation of God, Swinburne thinks, should have a sufficient connection 
within the cultural environment that the incarnation takes place to cause detailed 
reports of the incarnation as well as provide evidence of it for future generations. 
This revelation, he writes, should be accessible to almost any sort of person (e.g. 
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young, old, poor, educated), and it should be able to be transmitted across different 
cultures. 
With respect to the different cultures that this revelation would be 
transmitted across, Swinburne thinks that God could provide the revelation in two 
ways: culture-relative revelation or culturally independent revelation. The culture-
relative revelation would consist of God conveying the revelation “in terms of the 
scientific and historical presuppositions (both true and false) of the culture to which 
it was addressed, and giving moral instruction applicable to the situation of 
members of that culture.”40 In this case, Swinburne writes that God could offer, as 
part of the revelation, an account of the world consistent with the science of the 
people at that time (e.g. that the world came into existence 4,000 years prior to the 
revelation taking place), and it would convey moral truths that the members of the 
culture needed to know at that time (i.e. it would not deal with unique moral 
problems at different times such as medical research on human embryos, cloning, 
etc.). Further, Swinburne thinks that the promises of God, such as the hope of 
heaven, would also be couched in culture-relative knowledge of the world at the time 
(e.g. that heaven was spatially located above earth or some other such thing). This 
revelation would be sufficient to offer its immediate recipients with information on 
how to behave morally and a means to sanctification. In this case, Swinburne writes 
that false scientific presuppositions do not affect the veracity of revelation for 
religious statements: 
False scientific presuppositions would make no difference to the 
religious content of the message—that is, to the kind of life and 
worship which it sought to encourage. A mistaken view of what God 
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had created, or where Heaven was, would not affect the 
praiseworthiness of God, or the desirability of Heaven.41 
 
The second kind of revelation that Swinburne thinks God could convey would 
be a culturally independent revelation. In this case, God would give the recipients a 
creed of statements that make no historical or scientific presuppositions. However, 
Swinburne writes that this way of communicating a revelation, through human 
language, would use “a tool too feeble to convey an unequivocal message to all 
nations and generations unless backed up in some way.”42 This is because there are 
a number of difficulties, in Swinburne’s view, with saying much of anything about 
God and God’s relation to the world in the form of a creed that logically and 
rigorously captures the meaning that it is intended to convey across just one 
language—let alone across multiple languages and cultures. Swinburne argues that 
“human language can only have meaning to the extent to which its speakers can 
grasp that meaning,” but since the humans at a specific time could not conceive of 
all the future forms of interpretation and cultures, “they cannot have sentences 
whose consequences for the concerns of those cultures are always clear.”43 
A potential solution that Swinburne thinks God could use to make the 
process of obscuration of the revelation slower is as follows: God could provide both a 
culture-relative revelation and a culturally independent revelation in order for each 
revelation to check the other. However, Swinburne writes that even this would not 
guarantee against the obscuration of the content of the revelation because “not even 
God can give unambiguous culturally independent instructions accessible to humans 
limited not merely by the knowledge, but by the concerns and interests of their own 
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culture.”44 Thus, if the revelation is going to be public, Swinburne thinks that it 
should consist of publically accessible traditions (written or unwritten), but he 
thinks that these traditions should also be accompanied by some sort of continuing 
guidance that aids in the translation of the revelation. This, in Swinburne’s view, 
means that “there must be such a thing as a church in which translations have a 
better chance of success than they would otherwise.”45 
Now, with respect to God ensuring the correct translation of the revelation 
for different cultures, Swinburne thinks that God could use two possible means. 
First, God could use the means of an infallible authority within the church that 
declared the correct interpretations of the revelation when necessary. Or, second, 
God could ensure that the “truth would emerge in the long run by consensus within 
the church, distinguished as such by some organizational continuity and continuity 
of doctrine with the original revelation.”46 However, each of these means are limited. 
Regarding the first means Swinburne writes that there would seem to be an all-or-
nothing status as for what the layman should believe; there would seem to be little 
room for the individual layman to determine what interpretations she thought 
would be most congruent with the rest of the revelation by her natural reason. 
However, the second means is also limited in the fact that it is a weak way of 
preserving revelation. Even so, Swinburne thinks that some means of interpreting a 
revelation must be in place. 
But some method there must be if the revelation is not to die out. And 
it must therefore be part of the original revelation which subsequent 
ecclesial body constitutes the interpreting church; and it must be 
                                                          
44 Ibid., 103. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 104. 
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derivable therefrom how its interpretations are to be recognized, and 
what are the limits to their authority.47 
 
Section III: Concluding Thoughts 
Given the overview of the nature of divine revelation by Blaauw and the 
reasons why one would expect a divine revelation, if God exists, by Swinburne, I 
would like to move on to the central problem of this thesis—the means by which we 
might evaluate purported divine revelations. The problem of this thesis, that I am 
calling the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability, will be explicated more fully in the 
next chapter. 
                                                          
47 Ibid., 105. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE PROBLEM OF DOCTRINAL DECIDABILITY 
 
 
Let us imagine a villainous doctor of sorts who has forced a choice upon you, 
his unwilling victim in a secluded laboratory, and the choice that he offers you is 
this: 
You’re dying because of a disease that you contracted from someone 
you know who breathed on you. It’s not your fault that you’re dying; 
you had no justified suspicion that the person who gave you the 
disease was infectious nor that you were susceptible to this particular 
disease. Nonetheless, you are dying. I, though, am a brilliant doctor 
who, alone, possesses the remedy for this particular disease in the 
form of a pill. If you take this remedy, then you will both be cured of 
this disease and live a long, healthy life. However, if you do not take 
this remedy, then you will become paralyzed and live in utter agony 
for several days before your death. This is the choice that I am offering 
you: I have before you a pile of hundreds of different pills. Within this 
pile is the one pill containing the remedy, but ingesting this remedy 
with any of the other pills will nullify the remedy. Your problem is 
that all of the pills, including the remedy, are identical in weight, size, 
visual appearance, and taste. Choose your pill. 
 
This sort of forced choice is perfectly consistent with—and, perhaps, even 
expected of—a “villainous doctor.” We would not be surprised if anyone who was 
forced into this decision, or anyone who witnessed some poor person experiencing 
this decision, decided to predicate the doctor with words such as “evil,” “cruel,” 
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 or “mean.” However, I take it that we would be quite surprised if some perfectly 
sane person reacted to this situation by describing the doctor as “kind” or even 
“good” instead of the former predicates. Further, if this choice were exaggerated into 
a situation wherein one was presented with thousands of different choices—each 
one, other than the cure, leading to an eternity of misery and despair—then I think 
the word “cruel” would fall short of sufficiently describing the doctor. However, this 
situation might appear to be similar to what some religions hold as doctrine today. 
Specifically, some religions or sects within some religions hold that unless one 
satisfies the putative set of necessary actions for salvation offered by that religion or 
sect, then that person will likely experience an eternity of torment and misery. For 
my purpose here, necessary actions for salvation include either the act of assenting 
to particular beliefs or the act of completing (or refraining from) certain physical 
actions. 
If the conditions of the “villainous doctor” situation are not dissimilar to each 
person’s choice regarding their assent to a particular religion and if we are 
consistent in our reactions between the choice for a pill and the choice for a religion, 
then we should reasonably conclude that predicating God with the word “good” is, at 
the very least, inapt. The following question, therefore, ought to be asked: are the 
similarities between the choice for a pill and the choice for a religion sufficiently 
similar to imply problems with religious doctrine holding the idea, “God is good”? 
I will contend, for the duration of this chapter, that the similarities between 
these two situations are not as strong as some might suppose. The remainder of this 
chapter is, therefore, organized by two main sections. In the next section I formulate 
what I call the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability, and in the second section I discuss 
whether the problem succeeds in its stronger form. 
38 
 
Section I: What is the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability? 
I take it that the problem of this chapter can be reduced to a simple set of 
statements for our assessment, and the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability is that 
this set of statements is very improbable when taken together, but we want to 
retain, if we reasonably can, statements (1)—(3). The set of statements that I have 
in mind are the following: 
(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good. 
(2) God will bring about salvation for at least some humans. 
(3) Within some religion(s) is a set of prescribed actions, delivered 
by special revelation, that are necessary for salvation.48 
(4) Within the set of all religions, the claims of any particular 
religion are not more probable than the claims of any other 
religion. 
(5) There exists a plethora of religions with conflicting sets of 
prescribed actions for salvation. 
 
Call this set of statements the Problem Set (PS). Now, this set of ideas is not 
explicitly inconsistent; were we to take a subset of these ideas (say, [2]—[5]), we 
would not find that this subset obviously entails the contradiction of the remaining 
idea, (1). Nor does there appear to be some implicit inconsistency within this set of 
ideas. For example, we could imagine a possible world wherein PS obtains without 
some logical contradiction (e.g. Calvinism, or something like it, seems to be at least 
logically possible). However, the problem remains that we would not prima facie 
expect (2)—(5) given (1). In fact, given the “villainous doctor” analogy, we would 
expect that one or more of these ideas would be false if a good God exists. Thus, the 
obtainment of the conjunction of (1)—(5) is, at the very least, improbable, and it 
would be prima facie irrational for an epistemic agent to assent to this set of beliefs. 
                                                          
48 Note that the “necessity” of satisfying to this set of actions might vary for different persons. For 
example, according to Moreland and Craig (2003) the religious accessibilist holds that some religious 
beliefs are necessary for salvation to the degree that one has reasonable access to them. Thus, in order 
to put this idea aside I will assume for the duration of this paper that the sincere investigator has 
reasonable access to the religion(s) that contains the set of prescribed actions necessary for salvation. 
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It might be suggested that the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability could exist 
without all of the statements in the PS; for example, we could take statements (2)—
(5) together and, excluding (1), still have the problem of finding the set of necessary 
actions for salvation in some religion. In response to this idea, I would refer to the 
first chapter of this thesis where I suggested that from God’s goodness (in addition 
to God’s omnipotence and omniscience) and the desirability of human redemption, 
we have good reason to suppose that God would offer salvation to humans—in the 
absence of knowing God’s revelation—because of God’s purported attributes. This is 
in contrast to the villainous doctor from whom we have already obtained a revelation 
about a form of salvation; however, were it not for this revelation, we would reason 
that, in virtue of the villainous doctor’s character, it is not likely that there is a cure 
within the pile of pills. Thus, the possibility of salvation does not entail that God, or 
the even the doctor, must be good, but in the absence of coming to know a revelation 
about there being salvation, we only suppose that there is salvation in virtue of 
God’s goodness and God’s other attributes. Now, if we take away any of these three 
attributes of God, then, in my view, it is not clear that we would have good reason to 
suppose that God would extend salvation to human persons. For example, if God is 
not omnipotent, God’s ability to save human persons—independent of the necessary 
action(s) for salvation—might be called into question. Or, if we suppose that God is 
not omniscient, then it might be called into question whether God is really in a 
position to judge who should be saved, who should be quasi-saved, and who should 
be unsaved. For if God’s knowledge is limited, it may be that God does not know 
what human persons really have done or really do believe. In addition, there might 
be other relevant facts about the human person from which God would judge to 
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determine whether to save them or not; ignorance of these facts would render 
salvation problematic in the least (since it must be just). 
Of course, one might argue that it is not necessary for us to suppose that God 
is omnipotent or omniscient for our salvation; God need only be sufficiently powerful 
and sufficiently knowledgeable to justly save human persons. I grant that this 
reasoning, though controversial, is plausible. However, I take it that the most 
compelling reason to suppose that it is the conjunction of statements (1) through (5) 
that creates the problem is God’s goodness in statement (1). We might suppose that 
if God is not wholly good, then this would be problematic because a God who is not 
wholly good might not have a compelling reason to extend salvation to human 
persons—even if their salvation is desirable. If God is imperfectly good, then it is not 
clear that God, though good, would perform the supererogatory act of extending 
salvation to human persons. Instead, it is God’s perfect goodness, in conjunction 
with God’s other attributes, that leads us to believe that there probably is an offer of 
salvation extended to human persons from God. Thus, on my view, statement (1) is 
important for holding statement (2), and in the absence of statement (2), statement 
(1) becomes suspect. Further, the conjunction of statements (1) and (2) gives us 
reason to suppose statement (3) because God, who desires our salvation, would likely 
make the means of achieving salvation known to human persons—as the arguments 
by Swinburne that I summarized in the previous chapter show. 
Before I proceed, I should like to point out what this problem is and is not. 
This problem that I am calling “The Problem of Doctrinal Decidability” is, I take it, a 
subproblem within the larger Problem of Evil; if salvation is possible, it is an evil, 
after all, not to have had a reasonable means of being saved from some state of 
divine punishment. However, this problem does not pertain to the subset of evils 
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that contains the evils of pain and misery in the natural world (or, more narrowly, 
the evils that give rise to the Problem of Suffering). Utilizing Van Inwagen’s 
strategy49 on the Problem of Divine Hiddenness I want to consider the following 
hypothetical world to illustrate my point: 
WUtopia Within a secular utopian society there exists no real form of 
suffering. Medicine and technology have advanced to a point 
where people no longer experience illness, pain, or grief. 
Everyone is given an appropriate cocktail of chemicals that 
maintains steady levels of happiness. There is no war, no 
famine, no excessive hunger, no disease, no mental handicaps, 
and no mental illness. Everyone has a meaningful, long life, 
and no one’s life is cut short. Moral evils are nonexistent; 
instead, psychology has perfected the study of psychological 
health and the application of behavior modification. No one is 
motivated to commit evil and no one needs to. Finally, 
humanity lives in perfect harmony with nature and does not 
cause animal suffering.50 There is no Problem of Suffering. 
In addition to the lack of suffering, everyone has computer 
implants in their brains that permit accelerated learning, 
reasoning, and problem solving. Scientific truths are hardly 
debated. Rather, scientific, experimental results are published, 
and the resulting theoretical implications are both obvious and 
uncontroversial. Politics has lost its drama, and ideas from 
philosophy, literature, and the arts have flourished. The last 
remaining, significant debate within this global society is about 
religion. There are reports of religious experiences that lead 
some people to assent to particular sets of religious doctrines 
that, they espouse, are necessary for eternal life. Even with the 
current technological advancement, these religious experiences 
can be neither confirmed nor denied as authentic, supernatural 
events. Due to these reports, a set of prescribed actions 
necessary for salvation is the last major debate. 
 
From WUtopia we can see that it is, at least, logically possible for some world to 
have the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability without the Problem of Suffering. As a 
consequence, I think that theodicies and defenses that attempt to defend against the 
                                                          
49 Van Inwagen, “What Is the Problem of the Hiddenness of God?” 
50 The Problem of Evil might still be present, depending on the relation between the problem and 
animal suffering. Therefore, let us stipulate for this world the following: if animal suffering contributes 
to the Problem of Evil, let us imagine this world without animal suffering. This could be either because 
human technology has eliminated suffering in nature or, perhaps, because any such animal does not 
exist. Let all other creatures capable of suffering (i.e. aliens, angels, and such) not suffer or else not 
exist. 
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Problem of Suffering may not uphold the rationality of particular religions in the 
context of this other problem. For example, given PS, it is not clear to me how the 
presence of free will—which might be used to justify moral evils that cause pain 
within the Problem of Suffering—in WUtopia would save the rationality of religious 
belief for this subproblem within the Problem of Evil. The problem here, if free will 
affects the problem, is that the sick person from our analogy with the villainous 
doctor has too many choices by which she may exercise her free will in order to 
choose the cure for her terminal disease. If anything, she may have too much free 
will. Similarly, it is not clear to me how something like Hick’s “Soul-Making 
Defense” would defend against this problem either, since soul-making would be for 
nothing if not for salvation—and it is salvation that is at stake. Now, it might be 
possible for these theodicies and defenses to be repurposed in order to accommodate 
this problem in the future. However, I am skeptical of the idea that such attempts 
will succeed. 
Were (4) and (5) in PS true, I would challenge the rationality of most (if not 
all) contemporary theistic religions that hold (1) through (3). Thus, since (5) seems to 
be obviously true, my strategy for defending against this problem will focus on 
statement (4): “Within the set of all religions, the claims of any particular religion 
are not more probable than the claims of any other religion.” 
Section II: Does (4) of the Problem Set hold? 
In Support of (4) 
Coyne has argued that there is no reasonable way to distinguish between 
which religion or particular sect of a religion is true. “Given that most religious 
people acquire their faith through accidents of birth, and those faiths are conflicting, 
it’s very likely that the tenets of a randomly specified religion are wrong. How can 
43 
 
you tell if yours is right?”51 He continues by arguing that the only real solution to 
approaching any religion is to approach all religions with equal skepticism and to 
evaluate them by the empirical evidence of their claims. However, Coyne writes, all 
religions are relatively equal in their lack of evidence. Thus, he thinks that we 
should participate in no religion at all. “In the end, the inconsistencies between 
faiths, combined with the reasonable doubt that believers apply to other faiths, 
means that no faiths are privilege, none should be trusted.”52 
Kitcher also argues against the reliability of religious claims to be evaluated, 
suggesting (i) that acculturation often determines one’s religious affiliation. Further, 
he argues (ii) that religious experiences from which contradicting doctrines are 
drawn appear to be symmetrical: “There are no marks by which one of these many 
inconsistent conceptions of the supernatural can be distinguished from the others. 
Instead, we have a condition of perfect symmetry.”53 Kitcher continues by arguing 
(iii) that religious claims are so varied that any attempt to consolidate those claims 
into a single religion could be nothing more than a mere spiritual religion and (iv) 
that the spread of religions may not be due to the presence of miracles (or other 
supernatural evidence). Instead, the spread would be due to the mere utility or 
social advantages54 of the religion.55 Kitcher concludes with the following: 
We cannot yet aspire to tell the full story of why religions of so many 
different kinds have been prevalent across human societies, but the 
specific instances in which historical and sociological explanations can 
be given strongly suggest that the causes of success stem from the 
                                                          
51 Coyne, Faith Versus Fact, 85. 
52 Ibid., 86. 
53 Kitcher, Living with Darwin, 142. 
54 Kitcher offers the example that upper-middle-class women in the Greco-Roman world might have 
been more attracted to Christianity because Christian husbands were less abusive and more faithful to 
their partners, and pagans, seeing that Christian groups recovered better from disease because they 
likely cared more for each other’s wellbeing, might have been attracted to Christianity for better 
health. This is because better health might have been perceived to be a sign of divine blessing. 
55 Ibid., 141-44. 
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attractiveness of stories and alleged historical claims, on the emotions 
they provoke and the actions they inspire—and that they have 
nothing to do with the literal truth of those tales and stories.56 
 
Thus, for Coyne and Kitcher’s arguments, it would appear that (4) and (5) are 
true—that we are faced with a plethora of contradicting religions and no real way of 
evaluating the probability of a particular religion over that of the alternative 
religions. Coyne and Kitcher then conclude that no one is justified in holding that 
any particular doctrine containing what I will call a set of prescribed actions 
necessary for salvation (call this PAS) is true. Thus, if Coyne and Kitcher are correct 
with respect to (4) and (5), and if some religions are correct with respect to (3), then 
we really are in a sort of “villainous doctor” state of affairs. 
After considering the arguments offered above by Coyne and Kitcher, I would 
grant the more general ideas that they argue for as important concerns that support 
(4). However, I think that Coyne and Kitcher’s reasoning is seriously flawed. For 
example, Kitcher wrote: 
If, however, you had been acculturated within one of the aboriginal 
traditions of Australia, or within a society in central Africa, or among 
the Inuit, you would accept, on the basis of cultural authority, 
radically different ideas. You would believe in the literal truth of 
stories about the spirits of the ancestors and about their presence in 
places, and you would believe these things as firmly as Christians 
believe in the resurrection, or Jews in God’s covenant, or Muslims in 
the revelations of the Prophet.57 
 
I have three critiques of his argument. First, it appears that Kitcher’s claims are 
obviously too strong. Kitcher supposes that had his reader been born in a different 
culture, then she really would have believed in the native religious ideas of that 
particular culture. On the contrary, I think that there are evident counterexamples 
in the world of people who fail to adopt the religious beliefs presented to them by 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 144. 
57 Ibid., 141. 
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their social environment. Similarly, there are many converts to religious belief, and 
some of these conversions seem to take place through argument and reasoning 
instead of by mere acculturation. 
Second, it would seem that Kitcher makes a false inference of sorts. 
Specifically, he seems to think that both the variety of backgrounds from which 
different people develop their religious beliefs and the diversity of religious beliefs in 
the world are somehow sufficient to warrant a problem of credulity for those who 
assent to the religious beliefs of their cultural background. Now, I would agree with 
Kitcher on the idea that there are duties that individuals have to seek true beliefs, 
and I think individuals have the duty to consider how their beliefs affect the lives of 
those around them. I am morally against credulity. However, I would suggest that it 
simply does not follow that because one was acculturated within a particular 
religious environment that it is irrational for her to assent to the religious beliefs 
that she developed from that religious environment. My defense of this idea would 
consist of an argument in parallel to that of arguing for the reality of an objective 
morality across cultures. For example, moral customs and beliefs do vary across 
different cultures. Those who believe in some set of moral customs or beliefs often 
derive that set of customs and beliefs from their social environment. However, it 
does not follow from these facts that one is irrational in assenting to those moral 
beliefs that derived from one’s culture. Nor is it the case—because of the diversity of 
moral customs and moral beliefs across cultures—that there are not some moral 
customs and beliefs that really are better, or even more rational, than others. Thus, 
any proponent of Kitcher’s ideas regarding the rationality of religious beliefs might, 
if they were to apply the principles of such reasoning consistently, be forced to accept 
some sort of moral skepticism. If this were the case, then I would argue that in the 
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absence of an objective morality, the intuition behind the Problem of Doctrinal 
Decidability simply dissolves. If nothing is objectively good or evil, then there is 
nothing really morally egregious about what the doctor, in my example at the 
beginning of this chapter, does. Further, I take it that Kitcher’s reason for rejecting 
theistic religions is that there is a problem of credulity on part religious persons, but 
the problem of credulity is a problem, for him, because of its moral implications. For 
example, Kitcher wrote elsewhere on this topic: 
The legitimacy at stake is ethical. [...] Secularists can [...] abandon 
Clifford’s ambitious principle, and yet deny the ethical permissibility 
of holding religious doctrines by a ‘leap of faith.’ Precisely because 
religious commitments typically pervade the lives of the devout, they 
are not insulated from actions with serious consequences for others. 
[...] Only if the tie between belief and action were completely cut, or if 
conduct were under the firm control of an internal censor, dedicated to 
ensuring that only ethically permissible actions are performed, could 
the adoption of specific doctrine on the basis of faith be legitimate. [...] 
Giving a general license to commitments to religious doctrines that 
outrun the evidence allows the members of the diverse array of human 
cultures and societies to act on the basis of whatever interpretation 
they give to whatever sayings or texts they choose, to permit their 
inspiration to be Mein Kampf or the 120 Days of Sodom, and that is to 
tolerate fanaticism in all its guises. Unless the application of doctrine 
is always subordinated to a commitment to the ethical values, unless 
there is no ‘suspension of the ethical,’ the invocation of faith cannot 
legitimize acceptance of religious doctrine.58 
 
Thus, it is not clear that Kitcher’s own position, which morally condemns certain 
religious practices, could sustain the implications of his strategy of attack. 
Further, I would ask: is it the case that the religious person ought to 
withhold assent to the religious beliefs derived from her social environment simply 
because other individuals derive alternative, conflicting beliefs from other cultures? 
Let us consider an example to see. We might take some religious belief, B, of a 
faithful Catholic where the content of that belief regarding homosexual persons 
                                                          
58 Kitcher, Life after Faith, 16-19. 
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consists of the idea that “they must be accepted with respect, compassion, and 
sensitivity,”59 and the belief of an extremist Christian cult or Wahhabism in Saudi 
Arabia that holds not B by either persecuting homosexual persons or failing to 
condemn the maltreatment of homosexual persons. Now, let us grant that the 
justification regarding B or not B for the persons holding either of the beliefs is 
grounded in their religions alone; let us suppose, for our example, that the faithful 
Catholic has strong biases against homosexual persons that, were it not for her 
faith, would lead her to treat homosexual persons with hostility. Would it really be 
reasonable for Kitcher to expect the faithful Catholic to suspend her assent to B 
simply because another religion, such as Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, holds not B? I 
would think not. Even further, would we not have some reason to expect better 
moral commands from a God who is said to be good? Kitcher, however, did not seem 
to take this into consideration when he wrote: 
Christians will naturally think of themselves as different, but, as we 
have seen, there is no basis for holding that the religious doctrines 
they avow are any more likely to be correct than those of other faiths, 
even of radical and intolerant versions of other faiths.60 
 
Finally, if Kitcher’s reasoning is correct and if he had been born or 
acculturated elsewhere in the world than he was, then his beliefs regarding the 
truth value of some PAS could have been different than what they are (i.e. if he 
came to his atheistic beliefs by argument, the reasoning for such an argument may 
not have been available to him in a different place or time). Ought he not, therefore, 
suspend his own beliefs regarding those religions simply because of his placement of 
birth or his acculturation in some geographical and social environment? Or, 
independent of how Kitcher came by his beliefs regarding religion, is there no such 
                                                          
59 Catechism of the Catholic Church, paragraph 2358. 
60 Kitcher, Living with Darwin, 148. 
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thing as atheistic acculturation? In light of these questions (to which I think the 
answers are in the affirmative) I would contend that if there is a problem of 
symmetry, the problem of symmetry would be nothing more than a problem of 
acculturation, full stop. Therefore, Kitcher’s own beliefs about religion would suggest 
that his argument aptly applies to himself. For example, Plantinga has responded to 
Kitcher’s argument elsewhere, writing: 
At bottom, therefore, Kitcher's brief against belief in the transcendent 
is just that such beliefs display great diversity and that ‘compete 
symmetry prevails’ with respect to the origin of religious beliefs. But 
diversity as such doesn't prove much of anything (after all, the same 
holds for philosophical beliefs, including Kitcher's opinion about 
religion). And as for [complete] symmetry, to claim that it prevails is 
already to reject religious belief; hence it offers no promise as a decent 
way of arguing against such belief.61 
 
The Failure of (4) 
Many of the arguments summarized above by Kitcher and Coyne presume 
the idea that there are a plethora of religions in the world that offer conflicting PASs 
(statement [5] of PS). Coyne and Kitcher also support the idea that there is no 
reasonable means of evaluating the PASs of those religions in order to determine 
which ones, if any, are accurate when they refer to the transcendent and offer a 
necessary condition of belief for salvation (statement [4] of PS). 
Obviously, the combination of (4) and (5) have the potential to form a 
powerful argument against rational grounds for believing that any particular PAS is 
true; so far, it is difficult to see either how the contradicting PASs of different 
religions can be resolved or else how to show that one religion, or a group of 
religions, is particularly better than the alternative religions. 
                                                          
61 Plantinga, review of Life After Faith: The Case for Secular Humanism. 
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I take it that there are very general and obvious methods by which religions 
can be weighed and scrutinized. Specifically, it strikes me as obviously true that, at 
least on some level, religious claims can be assessed for logical consistency, scientific 
accuracy (with some exceptions on Swinburne’s culture-relative revelation), and 
ethical application. For example, a contemporary pagan practice of “casting spells” to 
causally affect the health or fortune of others is, quite clearly, at odds with our 
scientific understanding of the world today; or, in the context of ethics, I take it that 
there is no real contest when weighing the ethics of Zen Buddhism toward other 
human beings compared to that of Aztec human sacrifice. Finally, we have found no 
Greek gods on the top of Mount Olympus. Thus, religious claims can at least be 
assessed on these levels of skepticism, so Kitcher’s claim to symmetrical justification 
for religious claims—and statement (4) in the PS—is, as stated, clearly false. For 
some qualified version of the argument though, the problem remains in the following 
question: how many religions, after “tossing out” the falsified religions by the 
criteria above, would that leave us with? I suspect that it would still leave us with 
the Problem Set for a significant subset of the world’s top contender religions, so 
there is still a problem surrounding (4). Let us replace (4) with a qualified version of 
it, (4)*, and let us call the Problem Set with (4)*, Problem Set* (or PS*). Here is our 
new problem: 
(4)* Among the top contender religions, there is none which is more 
probable than all of the others.62 
 
I want to note, however, that work has actually been done on (4)* in the 
philosophy of religion. Methods for evaluating and comparing claims of divine 
                                                          
62 We could imagine the “villainous doctor” analogy somewhat differently while retaining our previous 
reaction. For example, if the doctor were to present to the sick person the same amount of pills as the 
previous analogy in two half-piles, and if he said that the remedy is in one half-pile of pills rather than 
another, then I take it that our reaction would be roughly the same. Thus, (4)* is still a problem. 
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revelation have been developed, particularly within the works of Swinburne as well 
as a particular work by Menssen and Sullivan.63 In support of this view, Slater 
writes: 
What such apologists for traditional religion fail to do, in Kitcher’s 
view, is to ‘face up to the most serious reasons for doubt about their 
favored transcendent being—typically the Christian God—rebutting 
the oversimplifications of Darwinian atheism instead of addressing 
the challenge of secularism’ (p. 257). Again, it is difficult to know 
specifically which defenders of traditional religious faith Kitcher has 
in mind, but I imagine that it would not be difficult to produce some 
examples. The trouble facing such a claim, however, is that there are 
clear counterexamples to it, such as the Christian philosophers that I 
mentioned above, [(William Alston, William Lane Craig, Alvin 
Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne)] who have dealt extensively and 
rigorously with the sorts of criticism that Kitcher raises in his 
discussion of the argument from symmetry. As it stands, then, 
Kitcher’s assertion seems to be false, as it appears to assume that no 
traditional religious believers have responded to the kind of secularist 
challenge that he raises. [...] The closest that Kitcher actually comes to 
acknowledging this impressive and diverse body of work is when he 
observes that there are Christian philosophers who ‘chop the logic 
with even more skill than the critics [of religion]’—but having done so, 
he immediately proceeds to dismiss their arguments with the claim 
that ‘all of this is beside the central point. It is a sideshow to the 
many-sided challenge of secularism’ (p. 258).64 
 
Thus, it is not clear in what sense Kitcher really intends to persuade his opponents 
to his side since, in spite of a vast amount of literature that Kitcher does not engage 
with, he produces strong claims that have already been addressed like the following: 
The trouble with supernaturalism is that it comes in so many 
incompatible forms, all of which are grounded in just the same way. 
[...] There are no marks by which one of these many inconsistent 
conceptions of the supernatural can be distinguished from the 
others.65 
 
So far, I have completed the narrow aim of this chapter of critiquing 
statement (4); I have provided strong arguments that show that (4) in PS is false. 
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Now, I want to introduce methods for evaluating PASs in order to lower the 
probability of (4)*. Thus, I will proceed with arguments aimed at lowering the 
probability of (4)* in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODS FOR LOWER THE PROBABILITY OF (4)* 
 
 
As I proceed with my attempt to lower the probability of (4)* in this chapter, I 
will offer with two sections. In the first section I will summarize Swinburne’s four 
tests of a candidate revelation, and in the second section I will supplement 
Swinburne’s ideas on the tests of a candidate revelation. 
Section I: Swinburne’s View 
Swinburne reasons that in order to test whether a purported revelation really 
is from God, we might assess the characteristics of the revelation and the events 
surrounding the revelation to see if it is likely to be from God. Now, when assessing 
the revelation itself, Swinburne thinks that we can “apply the kinds of tests which 
we apply to a letter to see whether it comes from whom it purports to come.”66 The 
sorts of tests that we would apply to a letter to see if it is authentic are, according to 
Swinburne, three kinds: the content of the letter, the method of the expression, and 
the transmission of the letter. 
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First, the content of the letter ought to be the sort of thing that the author 
would have written to the addressee; thus, in the parallel case for a revelation, the 
purported revelation ought to be the sort of thing God would choose to reveal to 
humans. Second, the method of the expression of the letter (handwriting, paper, 
signature) ought to be characteristic, or uniquely characteristic, of the purported 
author. In parallel, the purported revelation ought to be expressed by a method of 
expression that we would expect from God. This means that the method of 
expression should be unique to God alone. 
Third, the transmission of the letter consists of whether the letter really 
could have travelled from the purported author to its addressee. However, 
Swinburne writes that there is no real equivalent test of purported revelation for 
this test of a letter, and this is because God, who is omnipotent, “can produce a 
message anywhere at any time.”67 Even so, Swinburne thinks that there are two 
other tests that we can apply to a purported revelation in order to assess the 
authenticity. The third test for a revelation, Swinburne writes, is the test “that the 
church has developed the original revelation in a way which plausibly brings out 
what was involved in it, and applies it to new situations in a natural way.”68 His 
justification for this is the idea that God would not permit a revelation intended for 
all humans to become distorted beyond recognition. Finally, the fourth test is 
whether the interpretations of the purported revelation offer the type of instruction 
and teaching that God would give to humans. 
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In order to explore Swinburne’s methods for testing the authenticity of a 
purported divine revelation, I will now proceed by summarizing Swinburne’s 
arguments on these four tests. 
The Test of Original Content 
When testing the original content of the revelation, Swinburne means to test 
the message of the revelation (not the presuppositions in which it is given) to see if it 
is the kind of thing that God would communicate. To illustrate what we are looking 
for, Swinburne gives the example of a society wherein slavery is practiced: 
If the prophet were to say, in a society in which slavery and soldiering 
were parts of normal life, ‘Slaves, be obedient to your masters,’ or 
‘Soldiers, be content with your wages,’ and declare that he was 
transmitting the commands of God, those commands cannot 
necessarily be seen as endorsements of slavery and soldiering. The 
prophet may be presupposing the existence of the institution and 
simply telling individuals caught up in them how to behave. What 
these commands clearly rule out is disobedient slaves and soldiers 
mutinying for money at the time and in the circumstances of the 
command being issued.69 
 
Now, there are a variety of things that we would expect God to reveal to us—
particularly those things that we do not have adequate evidence to know about or, in 
the presence of such evidence, we have not put the evidence together to reach the 
important conclusion. So in addition to knowledge of God’s nature, moral truths, 
God’s incarnation, and God’s proclamation that a church should preserve and 
interpret the revelation, God’s revelations “may concern matters about which (before 
receiving the revelation) we do not realize that it is important that we should have 
true beliefs.”70 These ideas about which we should have true beliefs are ideas on 
important matters that deeply concern us; this, Swinburne writes, is the first part of 
the test of original content. 
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The second part of the test of original content is whether the content of the 
purported revelation is true, “and any independent reason we have for believing that 
some of the content of a candidate revelation is true is reason to suppose that the 
revelation is genuine.”71 Further, if we have an independent reason to think that 
some of the content of the revelation is false, then this counts against the idea that 
the candidate revelation is genuine. Swinburne uses the example of a purported 
revelation that contradicts our clear moral intuitions of necessary moral truths; if a 
prophet claimed to have received a revelation from God in which God said that the 
general activities of murder or rape were good, then this would be a good reason for 
supposing that the purported revelation was not genuine. Now, it may be that after 
God has revealed some truth that we see how we could come to that truth by reason 
independent of the revelation. Swinburne offers the example of philosophical 
arguments used to support the idea that God consists of multiple persons. These 
philosophical arguments come subsequent to a purported revelation that claims that 
God consists of a trinity of persons. Thus, even if we do not, at the time of the 
purported revelation, have the evidence to either support or falsify a candidate 
revelation, we might come to support or falsify the revelation by reason later on. 
Swinburne thinks we can argue that a revelation is probably true or probably 
false by either a posteriori means or a priori means. For example, Swinburne argued 
previously that we have good reasons to suppose that God would become incarnate, 
identify with our suffering, and offer atonement for our failings. A posteriori 
(empirical) evidence that would count against this sort of revelation (that some 
particular person in history is that incarnation of God) would offer reasons to 
suppose that this person in history was guilty of some evidently immoral conduct. 
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This would count against the purported revelation that this person was God 
incarnate since God incarnate, for Swinburne, would have to be uniquely moral. 
Similarly, any other relevant historical evidence that forms part of the claims of the 
purported revelation could affect the probability of the claim that the revelation is 
genuine. However, there are also claims that are part of a candidate revelation that 
we could not hope to falsify or support from evidence (e.g. non-necessary moral 
claims, certain ideas on the divine nature, and such). Thus, when weighing the 
content of a purported revelation, “all that can reasonably be required of the test of 
the content is that the content of a candidate revelation should not be very 
improbable on the grounds independent of the revelation.”72 
The Test of a Miracle 
The first test, for Swinburne, is not, itself, sufficient to show that a purported 
revelation is genuine; rather, we need an additional test that assesses whether the 
purported revelation has God’s signature—something only God can provide. For 
Swinburne, “a signature in a wide sense is an act which can be performed readily 
only by the person whose signature it is (or by someone else with his permission) 
and which is recognized as a mark of endorsement in the culture in which it was 
made.”73 Now, since God alone, according to Swinburne, sustains the laws of nature 
and can violate them at will, a violation (or a quasi-violation) of the laws of nature 
could function as a signature for God. This sort of violation (or quasi-violation) of the 
laws of nature, Swinburne writes, should be referred to as a miracle. 
In order to clarify the idea of a law of nature, Swinburne writes that “‘laws of 
nature’ are simply statements which record in brief form these powers and liabilities 
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of physical objects.”74 Now, a power of a physical object is its potential to act; for 
example, water has the power to turn into steam. In contrast, a liability of a physical 
object is its physical necessity (or physical probability) to act; Swinburne writes that 
this would be water’s physical probability to turn into steam at 100° C. Thus, we 
have two sorts of liability: physical necessity from deterministic laws, or physical 
probability from probabilistic laws. 
Further, Swinburne writes that there are fundamental natural laws that 
determine other, less fundamental laws of nature. A law is fundamental, in 
Swinburne’s view, just in case it is not explained by more fundamental laws. Now, if 
the fundamental laws of nature provide a complete explanation of all natural events 
and if there is no explanation for the fundamental natural laws, then there can be 
no violation of the fundamental natural laws. Thus, in order for a fundamental 
natural law to be violated, it would be necessary for some being (such as God) to 
determine whether a natural law operates or not. Consequently, in order to 
determine whether a law of nature has been violated, Swinburne writes: 
The evidence that some event E is a violation is that its occurrence is 
incompatible with what are probably (on the evidence we have) the 
fundamental laws of nature. The evidence that a purported law is a 
true law comes from its explanatory power (its power to explain the 
data) and its prior probability.75 
 
Swinburne illustrates his reasoning by considering the following example: 
suppose that, after observing the motion of many planets, scientists propose a law, 
“All planets move in ellipses.”76 Now, suppose that Mars happens to move out of its 
regular elliptical path for a brief period of time before returning. This event can be 
explained in two ways: either the event happened as a result of a more fundamental 
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law that caused the movement of the planet or else the law of nature was violated. If 
it is the former, then there would be some condition in the universe that caused 
Mars to leave its elliptical path and, were this condition to repeat, Mars would again 
leave its path. Thus, the law “all planets move in ellipses” would not be a 
fundamental law of nature; rather, it would be a consequence of a more fundamental 
law of nature. Alternatively, if the event is not explained by a more fundamental law 
of nature, then this would be “a non-repeatable exception to a law of nature.”77 Now, 
in order to determine whether the event is a genuine exception to a fundamental law 
of nature, Swinburne writes the following: 
We would have grounds for believing that the exception is non-
repeatable in so far as any attempt to amend or replace the purported 
law of nature so that it predicted the wander of Mars as well as all the 
other observed positions of Mars would give us a purported new law so 
complicated internally and so disconsonant with the rest of scientific 
knowledge which constitutes our background evidence, that we would 
have no grounds for trusting its future predictions. [...] What we need 
if the exception to the original law is to be explained by a more 
fundamental law is a simple formula consonant with the rest of 
physics, of which it is a consequence that the exception to the original 
law occurs when it does.78 
 
Swinburne notes that there might be cases that appear to be exceptions in 
the laws of nature but that the events in question, independent of our knowledge, 
could be explained by natural causes; in response, Swinburne writes that we could 
also be wrong about some cases that appear to have natural causes but, in reality, do 
not have natural causes. To solve this problem Swinburne thinks that the rational 
investigator of these events simply “goes by the evidence available to him at the 
time.”79 Even so, there are some events that would appear to be very improbable on 
                                                          
77 Ibid., 115. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 116. 
59 
 
the laws of nature, such as the resurrection of a dead man whose heart has stopped 
beating for 36 hours or turning water into wine without a chemical reaction. 
Shifting from the idea of deterministic natural laws, Swinburne considers 
probabilistic laws of nature (like events in Quantum Theory); in this case, the sort of 
violation that occurs on a deterministic law will not be used in the same way on a 
probabilistic law of nature because their probabilities permit unlikely events. For 
probabilistic laws of nature, Swinburne takes an exception of a law of nature to be a 
“quasi-violation”80 wherein the event is very, very improbable. 
To sum, violations or quasi-violations of natural laws are “changes in the 
fundamental powers and liabilities of physical objects not caused by other physical 
objects in virtue of their powers and liabilities.”81 Consequently, they cannot be 
explained scientifically, so, in Swinburne’s view, we should look for a personal 
explanation of the event. Swinburne argues that in the absence of evidence of some 
sort of lesser spirit (whose power does not depend on God) affecting the laws of 
nature, “the most probable explanation of any violation or quasi-violation is that it 
was brought about by or with the permission of God.”82 Further reason to suppose 
that God would have brought the event about, according to Swinburne, would come 
by showing that the event was one that God would have some reason to cause. 
Finally, “any violation or quasi-violation of a law of nature is probably a miracle.”83 
In response to potential objections, Swinburne considers the view of Hume 
who thought that the purported event of a violation of a law of nature is, itself, 
evidence against the event. “This is because the past phenomena which make it 
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probable that L is a law of nature make it probable that it holds almost universally 
and so that on the occasion in question, things conformed to L.”84 Swinburne offers 
two main responses: in the first case, he thinks that there are other sorts of evidence 
that some event in the past occurred, of which he gives four kinds: 
1. Each person has her own memory of the event. 
2. Other people have testimony of what they remember, and the 
more people who seem to remember an event, in general, the 
more likely it is that the event actually occurred. 
3. There are physical traces of past events that help us to 
retrodict what happened. 
4. The background evidence of events that happened at other 
places and times may offer evidence for or against the idea that 
the original event in question occurred. (Swinburne notes that 
this sort of evidence is, of course, dependent on the first two 
sorts of testimony.) 
 
In the second case of Swinburne’s defense, he argues against Hume’s idea 
“that background evidence showing what are the laws of nature would always 
constitute strong evidence against the truth of any reports based on testimony that 
some event had occurred”85 that violated a law of nature. Swinburne’s reasoning is 
as follows: first, there is no reason that the background evidence of a law of nature 
always outweighs detailed historical evidence. Second, “Hume’s main mistake was to 
assume that in cases of a violation of laws of nature, our evidence about what are 
the laws of nature is our main relevant background evidence. [...] Yet all background 
evidence about whether there is or is not a God is also crucially relevant.”86 This is 
because if God exists, then God has the power to set aside the laws of nature at will. 
Now, Swinburne concedes, if miracles were the only evidence of God’s existence, 
then Hume’s critique would be more potent, but since there are other, independent 
reasons for supposing that God exists in Swinburne’s view, there are reasons from 
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the background evidence to suppose that a violation of a law of nature could occur. 
Further, Swinburne writes, the evidence suggesting that God violated a law of 
nature would be stronger if “we can show that a God has reason on the particular 
occasion for doing what he does not normally do.”87 
Thus, as a test for a genuine revelation, the evidence of a violation of a law of 
nature in connection with some purported revelation is also evidence that the 
purported revelation is from God; in Swinburne’s view, the stronger the evidence of 
a violation of nature, the more probable it is that a revelation connected to that 
violation is genuine. 
The Tests of Church Fidelity and Developed Content 
Part i: An Interpreting Church 
In order for the revelation given by God to be interpreted in the light of new 
cultures and contexts, Swinburne thinks that it would be important for there to be a 
church to preserve the content of the revelation and interpret it in these other 
contexts. Now this church, for Swinburne, “would need to be constituted in a way 
determined by the original revelation, and in virtue of that constitution have 
authority to reach conclusions about which interpretations are correct.”88 The need 
for this sort of interpretation and preservation of the content of the revelation is 
apparent, Swinburne says, from the recent centuries of religious disagreement over 
religious texts. These disagreements range from varying interpretations of the 
literal or non-literal account of the creation of the world to contemporary moral 
issues in religion like that of homosexuality, divorce, and other sexual matters. 
“Without a procedure for authenticating an interpretation of what religious books 
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have to say about these issues, there will be no content to there being any revelation 
of such detailed moral truths.”89  This means that the third test of a candidate 
revelation, for Swinburne, will be “whether the original revelation includes a 
revelation of how an interpreting church is to be constituted”90 as well as if the 
interpretations of that church are plausible interpretations of the candidate 
revelation itself. 
In order for theologians of a church to interpret the contents of a candidate 
revelation, they must appeal to similar techniques like those used by historians who 
interpret ancient political or philosophical positions. For example, Swinburne notes 
that an ancient politician may have argued for some law on the basis that the law in 
question would produce economic growth for the poor, and a contemporary historian 
may write that this ancient politician was a Utilitarian since the politician seemed 
to believe that laws should help alleviate the greatest suffering for the greatest 
amount of people and produce the greatest happiness for the greatest amount of 
people. Provided that “the historian comes from a different background from that of 
the politician, he will try to express those principles by means of his own 
categories.”91 Thus, the theologian, Swinburne writes, will also try to formulate the 
ideas implicit in an ancient revelation in terms of the categories of his own culture. 
Similarly, Swinburne notes that Kant did not express his views on embryo research 
or genetic therapy, but “a Kantian scholar may find a way of expressing Kant’s 
moral principles which, perhaps together with some metaphysical principle about 
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the nature of humans which Kant would have accepted, will yield a plausible 
answer.”92 
In Swinburne's view, the test of an interpretation of a thinker’s ideas is 
whether the general principles that the historian interprets from the thinker’s ideas 
“are simple ones which entail almost all the sentences purported written (or uttered) 
by the thinker (understood in some literal way).” 93  Now, there may be a few 
sentences that are purported to have come from the ancient thinker that are 
inconsistent with what the historian takes to be the thinker’s position, and 
Swinburne thinks that the historian can use one of three ways to deal with these 
sentences94: 
(1) The sentences inconsistent with the historian’s interpretation 
should be interpreted in a non-literal way. 
(2) The thinker did not, in fact, offer the view that is inconsistent 
with the historian’s interpretation but that is attributed to 
him. 
(3) The historian’s interpretation of the thinker’s ideas fit so well 
with much of the thinker’s ideas elsewhere that the thinker, 
were he present with the historian, would come to deny the 
sentences in question that contradict the historian’s 
interpretation. 
 
In order to resolve a dispute about which strategy should be taken by a historian 
when interpreting a thinker's views, “it would be right to trust an interpretation by 
someone who had known the thinker personally,” and even if this person did not 
remember exactly what the thinker said on this topic, “he would have unconsciously 
absorbed the thinker’s kind of thinking and could help us to choose the correct one 
among possible interpretations of a sentence.” 95  Though Swinburne does not 
elaborate on this idea here, it might be good to add the qualifications that the person 
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who knew the speaker was familiar with their ideas and, as far as we can discern, is 
not inclined to pervert those ideas. 
Finally, since Swinburne thinks that it is crucial that God would provide 
some sort of interpreting church, evidence against an interpreting church of a 
candidate revelation, as a logical consequence, would be evidence against the 
candidate revelation itself. Now, what would count as evidence against a church as 
an interpreter of a candidate revelation (and the candidate revelation itself), 
Swinburne writes, would be “wildly implausible interpretations”96 of the candidate 
revelation by the church. This would count as “evidence against the revelation itself, 
part of which is that the church is authorized to produce correct interpretations.”97 
Part ii: Interpretations Consistent with God’s Nature 
The fourth and final test for a candidate revelation that Swinburne offers “is 
whether the interpretations of it produced by the church provide the sort of teaching 
which God would have chosen to give to humans.”98 Swinburne thinks that the sort 
of revelation that we would expect from God would be composed of ideas on 
important topics for humans and that these ideas should not be very, very 
improbable on other grounds. Now, if the content of a revelation were not itself very, 
very improbable on grounds independent of the revelation, then the interpretation of 
the revelation (if it is very likely to be a correct interpretation of the revelation) 
should not be very, very improbable either. 
Interpretation of the revelation that is not improbable on other grounds, 
Swinburne writes, could be reinforced by some sort of miracle. However, Swinburne 
thinks that “such an authentication of revelation would [...] defeat the purpose of a 
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revelation” because “the point of a revelation is to provide honest and diligent 
inquirers with some information, quite likely to be true, about the way to salvation, 
on which those who seek salvation for themselves can rely.”99 If there were too much 
evidence of a revelation, then salvation, in Swinburne’s view, would become too easy 
for those “who do not have a settled will to pursue it above all other goals.”100 For 
Swinburne, salvation is too important to give to those who do not pursue it above 
every other goal. Consequently, some evidence, such as a miracle, for a candidate 
revelation is necessary; however, overwhelming evidence in the form of successive 
miracles would, for Swinburne, defeat the point of the revelation. 
Swinburne’s Conclusion 
Swinburne writes that if there is a purported revelation that passes all four 
of the tests that he offers and if there is good evidence that there is a God, then the 
purported revelation is likely true.101 In addition, Swinburne thinks that there is a 
converse relationship between the likelihood of a purported revelation being true 
and evidence for God’s existence. That is, the teaching of a historical prophet that is 
supported by significant evidence in favor of a violation (or quasi-violation) of a law 
of nature is evidence that God exists. Swinburne uses the following analogy: 
If the police have evidence making it to some degree probable that 
there is a terrorist loose in the community, and so that there will be 
an explosion, then the occurrence of an explosion is additional 
evidence that there is a terrorist loose.102 
 
Finally, Swinburne notes that evidence in favor of a purported revelation will 
be evidence against any incompatible purported revelation; thus, evidence in favor of 
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one religion with essential claims that are incompatible with other religions is 
evidence against those other religions. 
Now, if we suppose that God exists, as Swinburne has argued elsewhere, and 
that we have good reasons to expect a revelation from God, then we have good 
reasons to suspect that there is a revelation from God out in the world. 
Consequently, it would seem to follow from Swinburne’s reasoning that evidence 
against a purported revelation could be counted as evidence in favor of the 
alternative purported revelations that are not vastly improbable on other grounds. 
For example, if we suppose that a murder has been committed and we have good 
reason to suppose that the murder is one of three suspects (suspect A, suspect B, or 
suspect C), then evidence against the idea that A committed the murder is, itself, 
evidence of the exclusive disjunct that either B or C committed the murder. By 
similar reasoning, evidence that counts against a specific religion being true counts 
as evidence in favor of the exclusive disjunct of its competitor religions being true (so 
long as they are not improbable on other grounds). 
Section II: Alleviating the Burden of the Investigator 
Prima Facie Methods of Evaluation 
From Swinburne’s four tests, it seems clear that there are methods by which 
a sincere investigator may approach the theistic religions of the world in an attempt 
to find out which one(s), if any, contains a genuine revelation from God. However, I 
think that there are additional methods for investigating a candidate revelation that 
would supplement Swinburne’s tests, and these methods are ways to alleviate the 
great demand imposed on the investigator by Swinburne’s tests. This is because—
assuming that Swinburne is correct with respect to his method of evaluating 
candidate revelations—the sincere investigator of God’s revelation would have the 
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burden of assessing which religion is most probably from God. However, in order to 
make this assessment, the investigator would have to have access to every religion 
in the world, as well as the resources to investigate these religions just in case the 
evidence for one religion can be better explained by the evidence for another religion. 
For example, if one supposes that Christianity is true in virtue of it passing 
Swinburne’s tests, it could be that some other religion also passes the same tests. 
However, this other religion may, as part of its purported revelation, offer some 
explanation for there being evidence for Christianity (e.g. it might posit that 
something such as demons, with the permission of God, had the power to cause the 
purported miracles in favor of Christianity), and it may have a history of even more 
fantastic miracles in favor of it than that purported for Christianity. Thus, in light of 
these possibilities, the sincere investigator would seem to be burdened with an 
enormous task of researching each and every religion just in case some religion 
could explain the probability in favor of another religion with better evidence and 
claims. However, Swinburne tries to counter this elsewhere: 
But I suggest that, for most of us, there is not nearly so much point in 
investigating the credal claims of religions which have not spread 
throughout the globe and which are not pushed upon us, as in 
investigating the major religions. The failure of the former to spread 
among those who do not come into contact with them is some evidence 
that they are not worth more serious attention.103 
 
From this quote, it’s clear that Swinburne thinks that the sincere investigator is not 
too overburdened to research every single religion in existence. In conformity with 
this sort of reasoning, it would seem that if a religion is having trouble spreading, 
then it is likely that such a religion does not possess compelling evidence for those 
who come into contact with it to adopt it. However, I take it this is not strong 
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evidence against one’s obligation to investigate some of the lesser-known religions of 
the world; further, it is not clear exactly how much a religion should spread, in 
Swinburne’s view, before it should be given serious attention. Provided these 
limitations, I am not in disagreement with Swinburne here, but I will offer my own 
arguments on this problem within the next few pages after I establish the context 
for my reasoning. 
Given the Introduction at the beginning of this thesis, I wrote that if God 
offers a standard of salvation by which human persons might be saved, it would be 
necessary for this standard of salvation to be a reasonable standard of salvation. 
Further, I wrote that the criteria by which God would judge one’s salvation should 
involve some voluntary act on part of the agent. Thus, if we really suppose that our 
salvation is at stake and that the Problem of Doctrinal Decidability really is a 
problem, then we would expect of the genuine divine revelation that it would claim 
that we ought to perform particular actions or that we ought to refrain from 
particular actions (or both), and these actions (whether we know it or not) ought to 
affect the probability of our salvation. 
Now, the claim that purported revelations can be evaluated by Swinburne’s 
tests is problematic in the respect that there are many, many religions (or even 
many sects within religions) that prescribe contrary actions, and these actions may 
affect the probability of one’s salvation. Thus, the initial problem of applying the 
tests of a revelation is where to begin or—if we have begun the evaluation but are 
stuck in the process—how to proceed. In order to lessen the burden of the 
investigator, we might consider what would be the preferable sort of religion that 
God would have established for human persons to follow in order to increase their 
odds at salvation. We might say that a religion is preferable insofar as it, prima 
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facie, stands out for the better—and so is more likely established by God—among 
the other candidate religions without us having to dive too deeply into the doctrines 
of the religion. In parallel reasoning, when a detective is investigating particular 
murder suspects she might suppose that certain suspects are, prima facie, more 
preferable suspects to investigate than others. For example, a murder that clearly 
required strenuous physical labor would make suspects with a greater potential for 
strenuous physical labor more preferable as primary suspects—even if it were 
possible for other, weaker suspects to have committed the murder as well. A sickly 
or weak person would, prima facie, not be a good suspect for the investigation unless 
some evidence were discovered (e.g. an adrenaline shot) that would satisfy an 
exception of the prima facie reasoning against him. 
In order to lessen the burden on the sincere investigator for our purposes 
here, we might expect for God (who desires the salvation of the investigator) to offer 
more apparent marks by which the probability of a religion is, prima facie, higher—
prior to utilizing Swinburne’s tests. Now, the more obvious ways by which a religion 
would seem to stand out for the better would be the following: (a) the religion is 
easily accessible to a majority of human persons; (b) it contains enlightening moral 
truths that a moral exemplar (like God) would communicate; (c) it persists through 
time; (d) it encourages the practice of proselytism; (e) it expresses that God has a 
positive disposition toward us; and (f) it offers motivation for performing the actions 
that affect the probability of one’s salvation. 
With respect to the first way in which a religion might stand out, that (a) it is 
easily accessible to a majority of human persons, we might reason that the 
accessibility of a religion depends on the capacity of its essential features to be 
understood by a wide variety of persons of varying degrees in intelligence and social 
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status. Further, the religion is more accessible if it does not require of its 
(prospective) followers that they perform specific rituals that are very difficult for 
certain classes of persons to do (e.g. make a pilgrimage to a faraway place, own 
certain things, speak certain languages, perform certain physically challenging 
tasks), and it is more accessible to the degree that the essence of its claims that 
affects one’s salvation can be simplified to a few types of simple actions or a few 
easily remembered beliefs. The religion is accessible to the intelligentsia to the 
degree that it can withstand rigorous, intellectual critique, and the religion is 
accessible to the impoverished when it does not require too much from them. For the 
reason that an accessible religion would be more apt at increasing the odds of 
salvation for more people if it were true, it is, prima facie, a better religion (and so it 
appears to be more likely from God). Thus, we might seek to evaluate the most 
accessible religions first since it is more likely that a good God would make available 
revealed truths that concern salvation for a vast population of persons. 
With respect to the second way, that (b) it contains enlightening moral truths 
that a moral exemplar (like God) would communicate, we would look for those 
religions that offer the most profound moral teaching that, independent of the 
religion, we might not know. These moral teachings would be truths that we would 
not come to know on our own, but we could discern that they are true apart from the 
purported revelation. Consequently, we would expect profound moral and spiritual 
advice from the content of the purported revelation, as well as from the followers of 
the religion who have taken up the pattern of thought expressed in the purported 
revelation. The religion should therefore offer certain moral exemplars who have 
lived according to the moral advice given by the religion, and it would be better for 
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these moral exemplars to demonstrate that the actions prescribed by the religion are 
capable of being followed by a variety of persons in a variety of circumstances. 
With respect to the third way, that (c) it persists through time, we would look 
for a religion that has not died out. If God’s revelation, as expressed through a 
religion, is pertinent to the salvation of human persons, then we would expect for 
God to help preserve the existence of the religion. Further, if, for some reason, 
attempts were made to extinguish the religion or the religion was being taken over 
by a new religion, then we would expect God to intervene in some way (by means of 
a miracle or by more subtle, psychological means) in order to preserve the existence 
of the important revelation. Thus, the age of the religion will increase the 
preferability of the religion, and this is because the older that the religion is, the 
more opportunity it has had to go extinct—and so the more it has withstood the tests 
of time, of rival religions, of advancements in science, and of possible attempts to 
eradicate it. 
With respect to the fourth way, that (d) it encourages the practice of 
proselytism, we would expect that the more God desires the salvation of many 
human persons, the more likely the content of the special revelation will encourage 
the practice of proselytism in order to increase the amount of human persons being 
saved. Of course, the proselytism prescribed by the religion must be non-coercive 
since coercion would compromise the PAS being satisfied voluntarily (or standard 
three of the reasonable standard of salvation offered in Chapter I). Thus, religions 
that practice proselytism as a result of the purported revelation are more preferable 
than religions that have less encouragement or no encouragement to practice 
proselytism from their purported revelations. 
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With respect to the fifth way, that (e) it expresses that God has a positive 
disposition toward us, we would expect that if God is going to offer us salvation, then 
it is clear that God desires our salvation. Now, since one does not seek to save what 
is not valuable (unless one is slothful or stubborn—which are imperfections that we 
would not likely find in God), it would follow that God finds human persons to be 
valuable if God is going to try to save us. Thus, we would expect that for any 
purported revelation it would, prima facie, more likely come from God if it expressed 
that God had some positive disposition toward us, and it would more likely not come 
from God if it expressed that God had a negative disposition toward us (exceptions 
would include temporary, negative dispositions for wrongdoing or foolishness). 
Further, if God sustains us in our existence, then there is, prima facie, better 
reasons for supposing that God values that which God sustains in existence than not 
(e.g. one does not sustain an evil in existence unless it is necessary for some greater 
good, and we have no reason to suppose that humanity is merely a necessary evil). 
Of course, it might be possible for a being like God to save what is not valuable to 
God, but it certainly would not be reasonable for God to do so. Thus, if God were to 
extend some sort of salvation to human persons, then we would expect from any 
candidate revelation purporting to be from God that it express that God has a 
positive disposition toward human persons—even those who are not yet saved (since 
they are also sustained in existence by God). 
With respect to the sixth way, that (f) it offers motivation for performing (or 
refraining from) the action(s) that affects the probability of one’s salvation, we would 
expect that if God desires the salvation of human persons that it would be likely that 
God would command, as part of the content of the revelation, not only actions that 
human persons should (not) do but also offer motivation (not) to perform those 
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actions. Of course, it would not be necessary for God to offer a motivation for 
performing the action(s) that affects the probability of one’s salvation. For example, I 
wrote in the first chapter of this thesis that it would merely be necessary either that 
one should know that they ought to perform the action(s) or that they should be able 
to come to know that they ought to perform the action(s) (and that they should know 
that they ought to mount an investigation into these sorts of actions). However, we 
would expect that if God desires the salvation of human persons that God would 
offer incentives for performing (or refraining from) the relevant actions, and these 
incentives could be anything from warnings of some sort of punishment to offers of 
some sort of reward. If God did not provide incentives for human persons to perform 
(or refrain from) the action(s) that affects one’s salvation, then it would be possible 
for most, or all, of the adherents of a religion to fail to be saved. For example, 
provided, first, that Christians were to take Jesus’ command literally that one 
should gouge out his eye if it causes him to sin, second, that most Christians sin by 
their eyes (e.g. lust, envy), third, that most Christians do not gouge out their eyes, 
and fourth, that Christianity ends up being a religion with a genuine revelation from 
God that offers a means of salvation, then it could be that relatively few Christians 
(i.e. blind Christians, Christians that miraculously do not sin through their eyes, or 
Christians that gouge out their eyes) are saved. Consequently, in virtue of the facts 
that Jesus did not provide reasons to take him literally or more motivation for one to 
gouge out their eyes (e.g. by repeating this command, elaborating on the importance 
of gouging out one’s eye, or by offering some reward for those who gouge out their 
eyes), we suppose that Jesus, if Jesus really were offering salvation and intended for 
his followers to be saved, did not expect his followers to really gouge out their eyes. 
Thus, we would expect that if God desired the salvation of human persons who came 
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to accept God’s revelation that there would likely be some additional motivation 
present in the revelation that insisted that people should perform (or refrain from) 
certain action(s). 
Now, when we come to evaluate a few religions that are relatively close in 
their preferability and are highly preferable, what I take to be the obvious next step 
is to both highlight and evaluate the greatest differences between the purported 
revelations of these religions. If all of the differences are minor, then it is likely 
either that all of these religions have low, equal probabilities or that they are 
equally true with respect to the things that matter. If we suspect that it is the 
former, it would be good to evaluate those religions with Swinburne’s tests in the 
order that they are preferable. If it is the latter case, then God has likely offered 
some form of revelation within each religion and preserved the content of the 
revelation to such a degree that the differences between these religions do not 
significantly affect the probability of salvation between the members of the different 
religions. However, if the differences are major, then it would be good for the sincere 
investigator to focus on these differences and evaluate them, as much as she can, 
from an a priori perspective (so as to save her from the huge burden of empirical 
research regarding the historical claims of equally preferable religions) at the outset. 
For example, religion R1 may prescribe that human persons ought to assent to belief 
B1, but religion R2 may prescribe that human persons ought to assent to belief B2. If 
B1 is incompatible with B2 then we have a contest between the religions, and the 
sincere investigator, on the basis of the differences between these two religions, may 
evaluate these differences, a priori, for both the likelihood of the differing 
prescriptions to affect the probability of one’s salvation and the ethical implications 
of the differences. For example, we might consider the case where some Orthodox 
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Christians separate the men and the women during their religious services such 
that men sit on one side of the chapel while women sit on the other side of the 
chapel. Now, if a competitor religion prescribes a different sort of practice—either 
that the women and men should switch sides or that they should not sit separately 
in the chapel—we will have a difference between these religions. In this case, the 
prescriptions of the religions are incompatible with each other, but given that the 
criteria for a reasonable standard of salvation includes that the criteria for salvation 
should affect one’s relation to God and that it is not clear how the practice of 
separating women and men in church or combining them affects one’s relation to 
God a priori, the prescriptions seem to be unimportant in the context of salvation. 
Thus, if separating the women and the men during a religious ceremony is one of the 
differences between two religions that have major differences, this difference is 
likely irrelevant for salvation. Now, what would be relevant would be the ethical 
differences of the religions; this is because if God is wholly good, then the state of 
our moral characters and the ethical implications of our actions likely affect our 
relation to God. Thus, if one religion claimed that it was morally permissible for an 
adult to marry prepubescent children when another religion claimed the contrary, 
this sort of difference would likely be relevant for salvation. Further, in the a priori 
we might judge that the religion which endorsed the marriage of a prepubescent 
child with an adult would be less preferable than its competitor. Thus, it would, 
prima facie, be less likely from God. 
Solving Relatively Equal Probability 
Given the above tests for the preferability of a religion that attempts to 
alleviate the burden of investigation for the investigator, it might be possible for the 
most probable religions to result in equal probability either on Swinburne’s tests or 
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the preferability tests. The reason why religions might come out equal on 
Swinburne’s tests would be that the evidence in favor of miracles for multiple 
religions comes out equal due to problems with historical evidence. If it just so 
happens (however improbable this event may be) that certain religions come out 
equally probable on Swinburne’s tests, then I think that the preferability test could 
be utilized to settle for a higher prima facie probability between the religions.
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE APPLICATION OF ETHICAL EVALUATIONS 
 
 
As Swinburne noted, we would expect that for any revelation issued by God 
that this revelation would be consistent with God’s good character. However, 
Swinburne seems to presuppose a particular sort of ethical theory for his purposes of 
the evaluation; for example, he seemed to think that because of God’s command, 
Abraham would have been justified in killing Isaac since God is the author of life 
and it is God’s right to give and take life as God desires. However, some other 
philosophers, like Kant, would likely hold that Abraham would not have been 
justified in killing Isaac—as we will see in the deontology section of this chapter. 
Thus, Swinburne seems to be evaluating religious claims in light of particular 
ethical theories that are, themselves, controversial. In anticipation of this sort of 
critique of Swinburne, I do not think that an evaluation of candidate revelations 
would weaken if Swinburne’s sort of ethical theory comes under attack. 
Instead, I think that no matter the realist, objective ethical theory (except for 
Divine Command Theory), there will likely be particular actions that are consistent 
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with those ethical theories. Thus, an evaluation of candidate revelations, in terms of 
the ethics of the candidate revelation, will somewhat depend on the presupposed 
acceptance of a particular ethical theory of the investigator. For example, if the 
investigator is a Utilitarian, then the fact that the candidate revelation portrays God 
as having commanded or acted in a way inconsistent with Utilitarian ethics will 
count as evidence against the purported revelation. Or, if the investigator is a 
Deontologist, then the investigator will evaluate the candidate revelation in the 
context of a particular form of Deontology. Thus, the likelihood of coming to a 
consensus on the ethics of the content of a revelation could prove problematic. Even 
so, if there is good, independent evidence that a candidate revelation is from God 
(perhaps there was some evident miracle) when this candidate revelation appears to 
be inconsistent with the ethical position of the investigator, then the revelation itself 
should either count against the ethical theory of the investigator or else against the 
idea that God is wholly good. Of course, rejecting the idea that God is wholly good 
has serious implications (particularly if we know that God exists and has 
communicated a revelation to us). But if we have good reasons to suppose that God 
is wholly good, in virtue of natural theology, and that God is wiser and more 
knowledgeable than us with respect to ethics, then it would seem that strong 
evidence in favor of a candidate revelation, inconsistent with the investigator’s 
ethical position, is itself strong evidence against the ethical position of the 
investigator. Thus, ethical evaluations of a candidate revelation would be strong up 
to the point of miracles; the presence of miracles, however, offers good reason for us 
to rethink our ethical positions if they conflict with the revelation. 
In order to see what an evaluation of a religion would look like, it would be 
good to proceed by evaluating a candidate revelation from the perspective of certain 
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ethical theories. We might come to evaluate PASs by expecting particular things of 
those PASs consistent with some of the statements in our Problem Set* in Chapter 
III. For example, if we suppose that statement (1) of PS* holds (that God exists and 
is good), then we would expect that any purported divine revelation should be 
consistent with the character of a good God. Now, since the meaning of “good” will be 
different for different ethical theories, I aim to offer an example of how such an 
evaluation could work on two major ethical theories: consequentialism and Kant’s 
deontology. 
Section I: Consequentialism 
For the purpose of our evaluation of a purported divine communication on 
consequentialist ethics, let us suppose, for the moment, that all of PS* holds; except, 
let us suspend our belief about the veracity of (4)*104. In order to see if (4)* holds, let 
us take some PAS in the world. Of course, this PAS is either true or it isn’t. Now, 
since we are supposing that some consequentialist ethical theory holds, this permits 
us to conclude that lying is morally wrong or morally good contingent upon the good 
and bad consequences of the lie. Thus, lying would be good if it brought about a 
better state of affairs and bad if it brought about a lesser state of affairs. Given the 
implications of the moral status of lying on this sort of theory, we may conclude from 
this theory of ethics that it is possible for God both to be wholly good and to issue 
some lie in order to obtain a better state of affairs—if the goodness obtained through 
lying could not be obtained without the lie and the goodness of the lie outweighed 
the badness of the lie. 
                                                          
104 As a reminder, (4)* states, “Among the top contender religions, there is none which is more probable 
than all of the others.” 
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Given that we are using consequentialist ethics for this evaluation, there is a 
unique problem that I would like to note before proceeding. Throughout this thesis, I 
have summarized Swinburne’s positions and offered my own views on how to find 
the most reasonable choice for religious belief. On consequentialist ethics, it is not 
clear that God would attempt to offer a genuine PAS within a rational religious 
system. Instead, God might purposefully deceive or compel human persons through 
some form of dishonest persuasion to satisfy the set of prescribed actions within the 
genuine PAS. However, this form of persuasion should not cause or force human 
persons to satisfy the PAS against their will, and this is because forcing someone to 
act against their will is incompatible with an action being voluntary—a violation of 
the third standard of salvation outlined in the first chapter of this thesis. So I will 
proceed with the idea that, on consequentialist ethics, God would not be seeking to 
offer a rational religion with true claims about the world so much as a religion that 
persuades its adherents or any prospective adherents to satisfy the true PAS. Thus, 
on consequentialist ethics, we should look to find the most persuasive religion—not 
the most rational religion. 
An evaluation of the persuasiveness of an idea is controversial since the 
degree of persuasiveness depends largely upon the needs, desires, and background 
(e.g. culture, history, biases, intelligence) of the intended audience. Thus, I will not 
be able to suggest that religion X possesses persuasiveness to a certain degree 
greater than religion Y for a specific audience with mixed desires, needs, and 
background; instead, I will be forced to evaluate religious claims by appealing to a 
very common practice of persuasion for a very general sort of audience with a mixed 
background: the attempt of a lawyer to persuade a jury. This sort of persuasion 
would likely make use of all sorts of fallacies that philosophers would scoff at, but if 
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God desires the salvation of all human persons and if some form of consequentialist 
ethics hold, then the use of fallacies to persuade human persons to salvation might 
just be the morally good thing to do. Thus, we would expect that this religion would 
make use of various appeals to the basic pathos, ethos, and logos of persuasion—
even if this form of persuasion comes across as dishonest to the philosopher. 
As we proceed with the idea that God might act as a sort of divine lawyer in 
the attempt to persuade the jury to God’s side—to satisfy the PAS—I think that we 
can reasonably expect certain things of this divine lawyer. For example, the divine 
lawyer would seek to make a case that, while not entirely rational, does not appear 
to be too irrational to the jury. Further, God would likely do things to strike at the 
emotional heart of human persons by appealing to their desires for happiness, 
justice, beauty, goodness, and other things to make them want to be persuaded to 
God’s side. Finally, God must portray God (and anyone that God handpicks to 
persuade on God’s behalf) as having the best of intentions and without any sort of 
duplicity of character or significant reasons to doubt their honesty. 
Now, as we proceed, there are obviously some things that a divine lawyer, or 
any good lawyer, would not do. For example, God would not use an apparent 
incredible source as the principle means of communicating a true PAS. This is 
because the incredibility of a source gives us good reason to doubt that the 
information conveyed by that source is true—just as the apparent incredibility of a 
witness in a court of law gives the jurors good reason to doubt that the witness’s 
testimony is true. Thus, with respect to the principle source, the apparent 
incredibility of a principle witness threatens the persuasiveness—and cogency—of a 
whole case in a court of law. As a consequence, if God were trying to persuade us of a 
particular PAS, then either God would not use an incredible source as the principle 
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means of disseminating the true PAS or else God would ensure that the incredibility 
of the source would remain hidden from the knowledge of the jurors—that it was not 
apparent. 
Now, let us suppose that the principle source of the PAS is some “prophet.” 
Given the assumptions and the argument above we could develop some sort of 
speculative argument regarding the credibility of such a prophet. The basic 
argument, that I will refer to as the Speculative Argument of Credible Witnesses (or 
SW), would go something like the following: 
1. Provided a good God, we would expect of this being that if he or 
she revealed some true PAS by special revelation, then this 
God would choose a sufficiently credible means of 
communicating this important revelation. 
2. If 1, this God would not choose to communicate his or her 
revelation through an apparently incredible witness105 to that 
revelation. 
3. Therefore, this God would not communicate by means of an 
apparently incredible witness. 
 
Now, let us take this argument and apply it to some candidate revelation in the 
world: Mormonism. An example of our application would be the following: Joseph 
Smith Jr., the founder of Mormonism, claimed to have translated some Egyptian 
papyri into a religious text called the Book of Abraham. However, now that scholars 
have examined and properly translated the remaining papyri that Smith used, 
Ritner and others have argued that the papyri actually contain Egyptian contents 
unrelated to Smith’s purported translation, the Book of Abraham. The contents of 
the Egyptian papyri were that of Egyptian funerary materials, and “Smith’s 
                                                          
105 An incredible witness of revelation would be (i) anyone who could not offer a persuasive case for 
those persons around him or her to believe him or her regarding the revelation (e.g. perhaps either a 
lack of miracles or else a personal history of delusions or excessive lying), or (ii) anyone who offered 
significant claims about the physical world as part of the revelation that both have been found out to be 
false and are not implied by the scientific or historical presuppositions of the culture (Swinburne’s 
culture-relative revelation). 
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‘translation’ does not correspond to the actual words on the papyri.” 106  While 
Mormon defenses have claimed that Smith had translated portions of the papyri 
that are lost, a parallel document “shows that the content of the missing columns 
concerns only the afterlife of the deceased and not the narrative found in Smith’s 
‘Book of Abraham’” and that “concluding that a record of Abraham [...] was once 
attached to the Smith papyri is an assertion not based upon widely accepted 
Egyptological analysis.” 107  Further, claims in the Book of Abraham do not 
correspond to the regional worship of ancient gods, and attempts by Smith to copy 
and translate Egyptian hieroglyphs show that “Smith clearly could not read, 
understand or faithfully reproduce Egyptian hieroglyphic or hieratic texts.”108 Ritner 
has also argued: 
While recent disputes over this or that feature of Smith’s 
interpretation typically dominate these exchanges, often lost in the 
greater picture is the simple fact that the Mormon defense of the Book 
of Abraham has been lost for well over a century. Long past are the 
days when any speculation could be attributed to the Egyptian 
language or history; such fantasies are intellectual casualties from 
Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition and the decipherment of hieroglyphs 
by Champollion. [...] The basic events of Smith’s romance do not 
correspond with either Mesopotamian or Egyptian history, and 
outside of Mormon confessional institutions, the Book of Abraham is 
not taught—or usually even noted—in studies of ancient history, 
religion or society.109 
 
Arguing later on, Ritner wrote: 
Egyptologists have been adamant that the Book of Abraham does 
derive from P. Joseph Smith 1, which was its purported source 
according to Smith himself. The fact that Smith’s published 
interpretation of the papyrus is pure fantasy is indication not of a lost 
papyrus or section, but of the ultimate source of Smith’s wording—his 
imagination. Since there is agreement that Smith could not translate 
                                                          
106 Coenen, “The Ownership and Dating of Certain Joseph Smith Papyri,” in Ritner, The Joseph Smith 
Egyptian Papyri, 82. 
107 Ibid., 82-83. 
108 Ritner, The Joseph Smith Egyptian Papyri, 99. 
109 Ibid., 7-8. 
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accurately the hieroglyphs on Facsimile 3—despite his published 
claims to the contrary—there is no reason to believe that he could 
have translated any supposedly lost section of the papyrus with 
greater accuracy. Here there is no question of a lost, ‘extra text,’ but a 
portion of the Breathing Document itself, surviving in Smith’s copy 
and interpreted fallaciously by Smith himself.110 
 
Whether it was misidentifying a vignette of Ta-sherit-Min for an image of 
Eve talking to the serpent in the Garden of Eden, misidentifying the Book of the 
Dead of Ta-sherit-Min for “the writings of Joseph of Egypt,”111 or just coming up with 
his own Egyptian “gibberish,” 112  the case against Smith’s ability to translate 
Egyptian and his translation from Egyptian, if not conclusive, is very strong. 
Thus, if Ritner’s claims are correct and SW above holds, then it would seem 
that we could rule Joseph Smith Jr. out as the principle source of a true PAS even on 
consequentialist ethics (not to mention even easier ethical theories to work with). 
This is because Joseph Smith Jr. would be offering significant claims about the 
physical world as part of his purported revelation that has been shown to be false.113 
Thus, independent of the facts of Smith’s religious experiences or the testimony of 
his followers concerning supernatural events, we would have a defeater for 
Mormonism bearing any true PAS that is unique to Mormonism—pending a full 
defense of SW. We would not need to dispute whether a good God could have been 
the source of Smith’s purported religious experiences since a good God could have 
deceived Smith on Utilitarian grounds, in order to bring about some better state of 
                                                          
110 Ibid., 178. 
111 Ibid., 192. 
112 Ibid., 274. 
113 Note that by assuming that the PAS in question was issued by God, I am not assuming that Smith, 
himself, must have been dishonest when he claimed to have received the revelation (even though the 
most likely conclusion is that Smith was dishonest). Nonetheless, this does not challenge the idea that 
Smith was an incredible witness. What I am assuming is that since this revelation was false, either 
Smith lied or else God did. However, since we could not know whether it was Smith or God who was 
lying, Smith would still count as an incredible witness in the same way a person subject to illusions—
who honestly describes his own experiences—is an incredible witness. Thus, if we gave Smith the 
benefit of the doubt, his experience of translating the Book of Abraham would, if God lied, be an 
illusion. 
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affairs independent of salvation. Thus, this sort of arguing would function as an 
example for evaluating candidate revelations on a consequentialist ethical theory. 
Further evidence against Mormonism on a consequentialist ethical theory would 
consist of showing, if it could be shown, that the content of the purported revelation 
either promotes or condones actions that produce lesser states of affairs. 
Section II: Deontology 
A method of evaluating purported revelations would be somewhat different 
on a deontological ethical theory, and this method of evaluation would differ for the 
different forms of deontology. For example, if we take a system of deontology that 
consists of absolute duties that cannot, in any circumstance, be violated, then the 
content of a purported revelation should not be guilty of prescribing actions that 
clearly violate these absolute moral duties. However, if we take a “softer” deontology 
that holds that duties only hold prima facie, then it might be possible for God, if God 
issues a revelation, to violate certain prima facie moral duties. This sort of 
evaluation would be trickier to handle, but Swinburne’s categories of moral duties 
where some are necessarily evil (such that God could not command them) and others 
are only contingently evil (God could command them) might account for these sorts 
of deontological theories. 
Now, in order to see what an ethical evaluation would look like on a 
particular deontological theory, let us again suppose that all of PS* holds, except let 
us suspend our belief about the veracity of (4)*. In order to see if (4)* holds, take 
some PAS in the world. This PAS was issued either by a good God or it wasn’t. Now, 
let us suppose that some deontological theory of ethics holds. For our use, we shall 
use Kant’s deontological theory of ethics where there are absolute moral duties. 
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Now, according to Pasternack, Kant rejects the idea that commands to violate moral 
absolute duties can come from God: 
One obvious case is where a putative supernatural event runs 
contrary to the moral law. Any miracle, for instance, that violates this 
law cannot be of divine origin (though, Kant acknowledges, it may be a 
“satanic miracle” [AA 6:86]). Likewise, we ought not accept putative 
revelations that command immoral actions. Accordingly, Kant claims 
that Abraham should not have accepted as divine in origin the 
command to kill Isaac, nor should we regard this passage as an 
authentic report of a divine communication (cf. AA 6:87, AA 6:187).114 
 
That is, Kant held that God would never issue some revelation that either 
commanded a violation of an absolute moral duty or conveyed a false115 PAS. Now, if 
Kant is correct in these respects, then divine revelation could be evaluated by both 
its ethical claims and its empirical claims. For example, if some “prophet” made the 
claim that God issued the command for us to lie in certain circumstances, then on 
Kant’s deontology we could conclude that this claim is false, that God did not issue 
this command. Thus, if Kant’s theory of ethics holds, we would likely use this sort of 
evaluation as a means of ruling out certain cases of purported divine revelation. 
                                                          
114 Pasternack, “Kant’s ‘Appraisal’ of Christianity,” 494. 
115 This is due to Kant’s categorical condemnation of deception. For example, see Mahon’s “Kant and 
the Perfect Duty to Others Not to Lie.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
OTHER PROBLEMS AND MY CONCLUSION 
 
 
Establishing methods for reducing the probability of (4)* could affect other 
problems in the philosophy of religion other than just the Problem of Doctrinal 
Decidability. For example, methods for evaluating candidate revelations could help 
with the Problem of Divine Silence, problems with religious experience, and 
dispositions apt for understanding divine revelations. In order to show how methods 
for evaluation of purported divine revelations could affect these other problems, I 
will briefly speculate about the relation between methods for evaluating candidate 
revelations and these other problems. 
The Problem of Divine Silence116 
I take it that the basic form of a strong version of the Problem of Divine 
Silence would be something like the following: 
                                                          
116 This problem is also known as the Problem of Divine Hiddenness. I am calling it the Problem of 
Divine Silence because I think that Rea in “Narrative, Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God” makes a 
good case for renaming the problem. 
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Premise 1: If God exists and is wholly good, all-powerful, and all-
knowing, then God would offer conclusive evidence of 
his existence in order to: (a) make the invitation of 
salvation known and (b) extend his felt-presence to 
human persons in order to both alleviate pain and bring 
about joy. 
Premise 2: God has not offered conclusive evidence of his existence. 
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not the case that God exists and is 
wholly good, all-powerful, and all-knowing. 
 
Swinburne, as I wrote earlier, argued that God would make his revelation somewhat 
hidden so that only those who seek it above other goals would be able to find it. Of 
course, this may have problematic implications for those who simply cannot pursue 
an investigation of the revelation in virtue of either their resources or their 
intelligence. However, the general idea that the hiddenness of a revelation would be 
more likely to pick out those who pursue it as a worthy goal over those who would 
not is reasonable. Thus, Premise 1, in this argument, would likely be rejected 
outright for good reasons, and a weaker statement would be substituted for it that 
the methods for evaluating purported divine revelations explored in this thesis could 
affect. Once the first premise has been properly adjusted, it will probably say 
something like, “If God exists and is wholly good, all powerful, and all knowing, then 
God would probably give us good reasons to suppose that God exists.” The 
subsequent premise would then deny that God has given us good reasons to suppose 
that God exists, and then it would infer from this idea that God, so defined, probably 
does not exist. This move in the second premise, however, would be incredibly 
controversial. 
I take it that it would be uncontroversial to say that some people think that 
they have good reasons for assenting to the idea that God, so defined, exists while 
other people would say that they lack these good reasons to suppose that God exists 
(or, perhaps, they even have reasons for supposing that God does not exist). Thus, if 
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God is silent in the world, then God would be silent to a certain degree—some 
reasonable people think that they either experience God or have good reasons for 
supposing that God exists and some reasonable people disagree with both of those 
statements. As a consequence, we might take the Problem of Divine Silence to exist 
in degrees because God’s purported silence, if God exists, is in degree. Now, if we 
think of the Problem of Divine Silence as a problem of degrees, then it might be of 
interest to consider a speculative argument, in the context of methods for evaluating 
purported divine revelations, that would run something like the following: 
Premise 1: If God or God’s revelation is known by some reasonable 
people but not others, then God’s silence exists in 
degrees. 
Premise 2: The degree to which God is silent depends on the extent 
to which the existence of God and God’s revelation is 
improbable on the evidence that we have. However, 
evidence in favor of God’s revelation is evidence in favor 
of God’s existence. 
Premise 3: God’s revelation is hidden to the extent that its 
probability is diminished. 
Premise 4: The degree to which the probability of God’s revelation 
is diminished depends both on (a) competitor, fake 
revelations that share the probability of being true with 
the genuine revelation(s) and (b) the availability of 
independent evidence in favor of the genuine 
revelation(s). 
Premise 5: Methods for evaluating candidate revelations both lower 
the probability of fake revelations and increase the 
probability of the genuine revelation(s), if it exists. 
Conclusion: Thus, if methods for evaluating purported revelations 
are successful at reducing the probability of fake 
revelations while increasing the probability for a 
genuine revelation(s), then methods for evaluating 
purported revelations reduce the degree to which God 
appears to be silent. 
 
Since this is a speculative argument that I am offering, I will not defend this 
argument here. However, I think that it is possible for methods for evaluating 
purported divine revelations to affect the Problem of Divine Silence, and this 
argument above is one way by which solutions in the philosophy of revelation could 
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interact with this problem. I think that my project in this thesis could aid in future 
research into the Problem of Divine Silence. 
Problems with Religious Experience 
One strategy of argument against genuine religious experiences takes the 
following form: if we consider the diversity of religious experience throughout a 
variety of religions in the world today and in history, then it would seem that this 
sort of experience, since it generates contrary beliefs that cannot be verified 
independently of the experience, is not a reliable knowledge-generating process. 
Methods for evaluating purported revelations would eliminate competing, purported 
revelations from religious experiences insofar as they generate controversial 
religious beliefs without evidence of divine backing for those beliefs. However, the 
content of diverse religious experiences, insofar as they are apprehensions of some 
form of the divine and insofar as they do not generate unsubstantiated religious 
beliefs, would not be eliminated by any method of evaluation for purported divine 
revelations. 
It might be worthwhile to explore a speculative argument from religious 
experience in conjunction with methods for evaluating purported revelations that 
argues something along the following lines: Claims of religious experience may come 
into conflict about the doctrinal content of those experiences. However, these claims, 
independent of the content of the purported experience, do not conflict with respect 
to the fact that there was religious experience, nor do they conflict regarding the 
idea that at least one religion is true. Thus, while the content of those experiences 
can hardly offer evidence in favor of a particular religion, the fact that a vast 
amount of persons have claimed to receive religious experiences would, prima facie, 
count as testimony of there being something divine to experience and would 
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probably count toward there being some true religion. For example, we might 
imagine a case wherein a few thousand people are at a beach resort, gazing across 
the ocean at midmorning. Now, if most of these people, without collaboration, 
express that they saw something across the ocean that was distinct from both the 
ocean and the sky, then (supposing that they are unable approach this thing 
on/over/under the ocean) they would have good evidence, prima facie, for there being 
something distinct from the ocean and the sky that was witnessed. Now, if we 
multiply the number of persons who claimed to witness this event into the millions 
and if we suppose that this event is repeated over time for different groups of 
millions of people, then we would have, prima facie, an even stronger case for there 
being something distinct from the ocean and the sky to witness. However, if we 
suppose that there are vast controversies between these persons about the color, 
shape, size, or movement of the thing across the ocean, we may have good reason to 
doubt that these descriptions of the thing being witnessed could be reasonably 
settled from witness testimony, barring two exceptions. These exceptions would be 
the following: either a group of persons may have a better means of coming to gaze 
at the object (e.g. better eyesight or a tool that enhances their eyesight) such that 
they are more likely to accurately describe the thing or determine whether a thing is 
really there at all, or else there might be prior reasons known by some of the 
witnesses of the thing to expect the thing to be a particular object with certain 
properties (e.g. if they heard news from a reliable source that a particular cruise 
ship was coming to their beach at about the time of the event, they might expect for 
the thing to be that cruise ship and for it to be a certain size, shape, or color and to 
move at a particular speed). Now, if there were no means to settle the controversy of 
the size, shape, color, or movement of the object, this would give us little reason to 
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suppose that this sort of controversy reduces the probability (by much) of there 
really being something distinct from the ocean and the sky to witness. Thus, it might 
be possible to reason in parallel about religious experiences. 
Some argument might be developed wherein the commonalities of religious 
experience are united to offer a vast amount of testimony in support of there being 
something divine and there being a true religion. Even further, the content of 
certain religious experiences might be evaluated if we have good reasons, prior to 
the experience, to expect that the experience is really of an object with particular 
properties (in parallel to that of the cruise ship example above). Thus, if a theist has 
good reasons to expect that religious experiences are experiences of God or of 
something related to God, then it might be possible for the theist of a particular, 
highly probable religion to salvage religious experiences that offer content contrary 
to the highly probable religion’s doctrines. The theist of this religion would likely 
reason that the religious experience is itself evidence of God, but the controversial 
content of the experience is likely due to some fault, voluntary or involuntary, on 
part of the experiencer’s spiritual disposition (in parallel to the faulty disposition of 
the eyesight of the witnesses above). Thus, if there are good reasons, independent of 
the religious experience itself, to expect that a religious experience should really be 
of a particular object with particular properties, then the content of a religious 
experience that offers a contrary account of those properties is, on those other 
grounds, likely mistaken about those properties but not about the existence of the 
thing. 
My research in this project about methods for evaluating purported divine 
revelations could aid in future research concerning either the evaluation of the 
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content of religious experiences or whether the commonalities of religious 
experiences generate a strong case for theism. 
Dispositions Toward Divine Revelation 
Finally, it might be possible, from the evaluation of purported revelations, for 
one to explore whether there is a correct disposition for approaching genuine divine 
revelation. For example, if it is the case that divine revelation ought to be consistent 
with the properties of God, particularly God’s goodness, then it may also be the case 
that in order for one to properly understand the deeper meanings of a divine 
revelation that one ought to adopt a disposition that would reflect God’s intentions 
when God issued the revelation. For example, if God issued some part of a revelation 
with the intention of compassion, then it might suit the reader (or hearer) of a 
revelation to adopt, as best as she could, an attitude or disposition of compassion in 
order to get more out of the deeper meaning of the revelation. In parallel reasoning, 
we come to better understand a poem or song when we better dispose ourselves to 
the context with which the poem or song was written. For example, if one is in a 
state of melancholy, then a poem or song expressing a melancholic meaning might 
be more richly understood in that state of melancholy. Alternatively, a jubilant 
painting or song may, for a jubilant person, also have a richer meaning. 
Consequently, in order to get at the deeper meanings that Swinburne suggests, it 
might be worthwhile to dispose ourselves, as best as we could, to the mood reflected 
in the segment of the purported divine revelation (barring moods that would likely 
corrupt our characters). Since the divine revelation would likely be a means for God 
to express profound spiritual truths to us and it may not be possible to express those 
truths semantically, a proper disposition to a part of a divine revelation may open 
the reader (or hearer) to a deeper understanding of the divine revelation itself. Thus, 
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because a divine revelation must be consistent with the properties of God, in order to 
appropriately apprehend a divine revelation, one might speculate further on 
methods for creating an appropriate disposition toward a divine revelation in order 
to extract meaning on, as Swinburne called it, “deep and important matters.”117 
Thus, the openness of the investigator who searches for a genuine divine revelation 
might benefit from approaching a segment of purported revelation with an attitude 
consistent with the context of the religious teaching. Thus, for future attempts to 
exercise methods for evaluating purported revelation, it might be worthwhile for the 
investigator to research not merely the content of a religious text but also the 
commentaries and culture within which it was said before attempting to pronounce 
some judgement on its intended meaning. Further research might be made in this 
area of the philosophy of revelation on how to fairly approach certain religions for an 
investigator’s evaluation. 
Eastern Religions 
Finally, it might be objected that I have not addressed the evaluation of 
Eastern religions in this thesis (or other non-theistic religions). In order to answer 
this worry, I will offer, first, Swinburne’s remarks on Eastern religions and then my 
own reasons for why I have not yet addressed these religions. Swinburne wrote: 
Many Eastern religions do not purport to have a revelation. The 
grounds for believing Buddhism are not supposed to be that the 
Buddhist message comes from God. Whether or not there is a God is 
not a central matter for Buddhism, and even if a Buddhist affirms 
that there is a God, the grounds for believing the Buddhist message 
(e.g. about the goodness of pursuing the noble eightfold path) are not 
that it has been revealed by God, but rather its intrinsic plausibility, 
and that it has been found by wise men in some sense to ‘work’. The 
same goes for the messages of Confucianism and Taoism. Certainly 
Hinduism often claims that God has become incarnate on various 
occasions, and revealed certain things about the divine nature and the 
                                                          
117 Swinburne, Revelation, 109. 
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goodness of certain ways of conduct. But the grounds for believing 
those things—for instance, the Bhagavad Gita—are not that this is a 
revelation. Rather, the process of inference must go the other way 
round. The message seems on other grounds to be true, and that is 
some reason for supposing that it comes from God. My grounds for 
saying that the process of inference ‘must’ go the other way round are 
that Hinduism makes no detailed claim to evidence of revelation other 
than the content of the message, no appeal to particular historical 
facts concerning its promulgation which might authenticate the 
message. And the content of the message concerns not any particular 
future acts of God, but general truths of a kind on which wise human 
thinkers might stumble. By contrast, the three ‘Abrahamic’ religions 
(Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) do proclaim that God has revealed 
certain truths.118 
 
Of course, Swinburne’s remarks do not disprove these other religions, but his ideas 
contained here and his surrounding arguments complicate what would count as 
evidence in favor of these other religions. 
My reasons for not including methods for the evaluation of Eastern religions 
are threefold: first, it is not clear to me that Eastern religions demand exclusive 
devotion to a particular god, so some Eastern religious practices and beliefs might be 
compatible with Western religions depending on the exclusive nature of the Western 
religion. As a consequence, it is not clear that there should be methods for 
evaluating Eastern religious practices or beliefs that do not conflict with probable 
Western religions. Second, it might be possible for devotees to a particular Western 
religion to practice Eastern spiritual practices that increase the probability of the 
devotees being saved or quasi-saved—in whatever way there is salvation. So if the 
aim of this thesis is to consider methods for evaluating purported divine revelations 
for the purpose of increasing one’s odds at salvation, it is not clear to me how 
engaging in some Eastern practices would lessen one’s likelihood of being saved. 
Third, non-theistic religions, since they do not appeal to a supernatural person to 
                                                          
118 Ibid., 127. 
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function as a source of testimony for supernatural life, are burdened with having to 
provide empirical evidence for every unique claim of their religion to the degree that 
it conflicts with other religions on significant doctrines. By contrast, theistic 
religions, to the degree that they conflict on significant doctrines, must provide 
evidence that the communication is from God, and strong evidence that a particular 
revelation is from God is strong evidence in favor of the individual parts of the 
purported revelation. Thus, to the degree that non-theistic religions are 
incompatible with theistic religions, non-theistic religions must have strong, 
empirical evidence supporting their plausibility, and they must be able to better 
explain both the evidence in favor of a particular theistic religion and the evidence 
in favor of theism than theists themselves. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Throughout the course of this thesis, I considered what would constitute a 
reasonable standard of salvation, what a divine revelation is and reasons to expect a 
divine revelation, a problem that arises in the philosophy of revelation if we do not 
have good methods for evaluating purported divine revelations, and methods for 
evaluating purported divine revelations. I further offered an example of what one 
sort of evaluation would look like in the context of two major ethical theories, and I 
also offered conclusions from Egyptologists that strike at the heart of the Mormon 
religion—the plausibility of their “prophet” to have communicated a divine 
revelation. Of course, the defense of my thesis does not rest on this attack on 
Mormonism since it functions merely as an example for an application of the general 
methods proposed and summarized in this thesis. Finally, I offered speculation on 
how the methods for evaluating purported divine revelation that were explored in 
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this thesis might aid philosophers of religion with other problems in the philosophy 
of religion. 
These supplemental methods to Swinburne’s tests were formed a priori on 
the basis of what we would expect either minimally from God (what a genuine divine 
revelation can and cannot do) or optimally from God (from our definition of God, we 
would expect more than just the minimum requirements of a revelation). An 
application of these methods to the major religions of the world would be a different 
project than the aim of this thesis—which was to argue in favor of there being 
methods for evaluating purported divine revelations and to offer some of these 
methods. Consequently, I think that Kitcher, and other atheists or agnostics who 
think that there are no means (or few means) by which one can assess the 
probability of certain religions over others, are greatly mistaken on the topic. Or, in 
the words of Michael Slater: 
One of the assumptions underlying Kitcher’s analysis of the challenge 
of secularism, as we have seen, is that there are no cogent arguments 
or evidence for theism or other traditional forms of religious faith. And 
this assumption, in my view, is not only mistaken but also reveals 
either a fundamental lack of knowledge of the relevant arguments and 
evidence or simply an indifference to engaging with them in any 
serious way.119 
 
Whether Kitcher would agree to all of the forms of evaluation in this thesis is, of 
course, unknown to me, but Kitcher’s assertion that there are no methods for 
evaluating purported divine revelations such that some are more probable than 
others is gravely mistaken. 
Finally, independent of my critique of Kitcher’s arguments in Chapter III of 
this thesis, it is my hope that these methods for evaluating purported divine 
revelations will, if there exists a genuine case of divine revelation in the world today, 
                                                          
119 Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion, 151. 
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assist a sincere investigator in her pursuit of a true religion. Further, even though 
there is much more that can be said on this topic, I hope that these ideas will help 
the sincere investigator, if there is such a thing as salvation within a true religion, 
increase her odds of salvation and the avoidance of damnation or purgatory or even 
the lower levels of happiness in heaven if heaven consists of levels of happiness120—
even if most or all human persons are saved in the end.121 
                                                          
120 For example, see ST I-II. Q5. A2. 
121 For example, see Kronen and Reitan’s God's Final Victory. 
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